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A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE IN THE
WAKE OF DAUBER T: THE LIE DETECTOR
FAILS THE TEST
The polygraph and other deception detection instruments have suf-
fered through a tumultuous seventy years in the American legal system.1
The issue of lie detector admissibility first arose in the landmark decision
of Frye v. United States,' in which a court held that the proffered expert
scientific evidence must gain the "general acceptance" of the relevant
scientific community prior to gaining admittance at trial.3 Since then,
courts have struggled to determine the admissibility of "scientific" evi-
dence that purported to distinguish between truths and lies.4 Over time,
1. See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text & Part II.B (describing the history of
the polygraph in the American legal system). Despite the various approaches courts ap-
plied to determine the admissibility of polygraph testimony, jurisdictions generally agreed
that the proffered evidence was not admissible at trial. See James R. McCall, Misconcep-
tions and Revaluation-Polygraph Evidence After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 363.
2. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye involved a dispute over the admissibility of a
systolic blood pressure deception test, an earlier form of the modern polygraph machine.
See id. at 1014. The blood pressure deception test at issue in Frye was not the first tech-
nique developed involving physiological measurements that could allegedly distinguish
truth from deceit. See Richard H. Underwood, Truth Verifiers: From the Hot Iron to the
Lie Detector, 84 KY. L.J. 597, 628-29 (1995) (describing ancient ordeals that were used to
determine the veracity of individuals). Some 4,000 years ago, the Chinese developed a
technique of listening to a subject's heartbeat in order to determine the truthfulness of his
statements. See JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at
373 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. Kenyans employed a test in which a sub-
ject swallowed a small morsel of food, believing that if the amount of saliva decreased,
the individual was lying. See Underwood, supra, at 628-29. Ancient Hindus compelled an
accused to spit rice in a certain manner onto a type of sacred leaf. See DAVID THORESON
LYKKEN, A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD: USES AND ABUSES OF THE LIE DETECTOR 26
(1981). Failure to spit properly resulted in a finding of guilt. See id.
3. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Decided in 1923 by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Frye held that prior to admitting expert testimony into trial, the principles
upon which the testimony relies must be proven to have gained the general acceptance of
the appropriate scientific community. See id. at 1013, 1014. Known as the Frye test, this
standard would serve as the primary gauge for determining the admissibility of not only
polygraph evidence but also scientific evidence in general for nearly seven decades. See
Charles R. Honts & Bruce D. Quick, The Polygraph in 1995: Progress in Science and the
Law, 71 N.D. L. REV. 987, 987 (1995); see also infra Part II.A (describing Frye's general
acceptance test and its application in more detail).
4. See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text & Part II.B (discussing the lack of uni-
formity in jurisdictions deciding issues of polygraph admissibility).
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three dominant approaches regarding the admissibility of polygraph tes-
timony emerged.5 The first approach, which a majority of jurisdictions
adopted, was a per se rule of inadmissibility barring the use of polygraph
test results for any reason whatsoever.6 The second approach allowed
the use of the evidence only when both parties stipulated in advance to
its inclusion.7 Lastly, a few jurisdictions chose to allow the use of poly-
graph evidence at trial when specified conditions were met, even without
stipulation.8 The vast majority of courts maintained a per se inadmissi-
bility rule, citing, among other things, unreliability, undue jury influence,
and lack of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.9
In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," the Su-
preme Court altered the standard that courts were to use in judging the
5. See United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1989); see also
infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (uphold-
ing a per se rule of inadmissibility); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir.
1959) (rejecting polygraph evidence); Grant v. State, 374 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tenn. 1964)
(choosing to exclude polygraph test results).
7. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 788 F.2d 517, 519 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986) (admit-
ting only stipulated polygraph results); State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (Ariz. 1962)
(admitting polygraph evidence pursuant to a stipulation signed by both parties); Codie v.
State, 313 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. 1975) (permitting the admission of polygraph results based
on oral stipulation, so long as the defendant voluntarily submits to the polygraph test);
State v. Roach, 576 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Kan. 1978) (allowing the admission of polygraph
evidence if so stipulated on the record, provided defendant consents to the examination,
the examiner is subject to cross-examination, and the court finds the examiner and test
procedures acceptable); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 457 (Wyo. 1977) (requiring cross-
examination of the examiner and a showing of test reliability in addition to the stipula-
tion).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
polygraph evidence can be admissible if used for a limited purpose); United States v. Bo-
wen, 857 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (admitting polygraph testimony in order to show
that a test has been given, notwithstanding the results); United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J.
246, 253 (C.M.A. 1987) (holding polygraph evidence to be admissible to determine if the
testee lied during the examination); State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204, 204-05 (N.M. 1975)
(allowing the admission of polygraph evidence provided the examiner is qualified, the
testing process can be shown to be reliable, and the actual tests are valid).
9. See McCall, supra note 1, at 369. Professor McCall asserts that these grounds are
"illogical and should no longer be invoked after Daubert." Id. This Comment will cast
significant doubt upon Professor McCall's theory.
The last reason stated for rejecting polygraph testimony, lack of general acceptance,
was derived from Frye v. United States. See 293 F. at 1014; see also infra Part II.A (de-
scribing the test set out in Frye). The general acceptance standard became the yardstick
by which courts ascertained the admissibility of all scientific evidence. See Paul C. Gian-
nelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205-06 (1980) (providing an in-depth analysis of the im-
pact of the Frye decision); see also infra note 85.
10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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admissibility of expert scientific testimony." According to Daubert, the
Federal Rules of Evidence displaced the Frye test of general accep-
tance.12 General acceptance was no longer the crucial factor in deter-
mining the admissibility of expert scientific evidence.13 Instead, Rule
702, dealing with expert testimony, 4 and the rest of the Federal Rules
were controlling. 5 Under Daubert, trial judges are responsible for as-
suring that proposed testimony is "scientific knowledge" capable of aid-
ing the trier of fact in resolving an issue at hand. 6 If so, the evidence is
admissible.
7
Many commentators predicted that the Daubert decision would have
little long-term effect on the admissibility of proffered scientific testi-
mony." The Daubert standard, however, has profoundly influenced re-
cent rulings regarding polygraph testimony." Some jurisdictions main-
11. See id. at 592.
12. See id. at 589.
13. See id. At least one court interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence as replacing
the Frye standard long before Daubert. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194,
1198, 1200 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978).
14. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 states in full: "If scientifiC, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
15. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. The petitioners in Daubert asserted that the Frye
test "was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. The Su-
preme Court agreed with this assertion. See id.
16. See id. at 592.
17. See id. Of course, in order to gain admittance, the Court encourages the lower
courts to "be mindful of other applicable rules." Id. at 595. This means compliance with
Rules 401 and 402 dealing with relevance, Rule 706 pertaining to court-appointed experts
and, most importantly, Rule 403, allowing relevant evidence to be excluded if unfair
prejudice to the jury would result. See id.
18. See The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 258
(1993) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (theorizing that Daubert would produce few changes
for questions of expert scientific testimony admissibility). One commentator stated that
"the similarity of the four Daubert criteria to factors commonly utilized under Frye sug-
gests that the practical impact of the new test will be minimal." Id.; see also Arvin
Maskin, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The Supreme
Court Catches Up with a Decade of Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1929, 1930
(1994) (arguing that some lower courts have already implemented a similar "gatekeep-
ing" role in the years prior to Daubert).
19. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 896 (D.N.M. 1995) (determining
that a specific Daubert inquiry by the trial judge may allow admission of reliable poly-
graph evidence); see also United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D. Ariz.
1995) (applying Daubert and concluding that polygraph evidence is admissible based on
certain case-specific facts). In Crumby, the judge relied extensively on the testimony of
the defendant's expert, eminent polygraph expert Dr. David Raskin. Id. at 1358-61.
When the judge ran into potential complications in overcoming the Daubert admissibility
standard, the unquestioned views of Dr. Raskin were used to overcome the difficulties.
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taining per se rules of inadmissibility have been compelled to re-evaluate
their positions in the wake of the Daubert mandate." As a result, the po-
tential for admissibility of polygraph evidence appears to be greater than
ever before.2
Yet, are such reassessments wise? Many of the arguments used to at-
tack the sagacity of admitting polygraph data are still viable under the
Daubert standard. 2 Questions abound regarding the theory behind the
polygraph,23 the test's validity," the standards that control both the ex-aminers and the actual tests themselves, 25 the impact of polygraph results
See id. at 1361. One commentator predicted such reliance shortly after Daubert was de-
cided. See Leading Cases, supra note 18, at 255. According to this theory, since trial
judges lack the expertise to carry out the gatekeeping role, their ability to perform this
function "will depend upon effective use of expert evaluations of scientific validity." Id.
20. See Miller v. Heaven, 922 F. Supp. 495, 500 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that it is
"necessary for the court to evaluate the admissibility of polygraph examinations in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert").
21. See, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995) (removing the
per se rule of inadmissibility for polygraph evidence); Chatwin v. Davis County, 936 F.
Supp. 832, 834-35 (D. Utah 1996) (detailing the current trend in state and federal courts
to reconsider the admissibility of polygraph testimony); Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 896
(admitting testimony by a polygraph expert); Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1364 (allowing
polygraph evidence into trial for a "limited purpose"). See generally McCall, supra note
1, at 422 (concluding that "[tihe pariah status of polygraph evidence is obviously coming
to an end").
22. See generally infra Part IV (applying the Daubert criteria to the question of poly-
graph admissibility). For instance, Daubert encourages the trial judge to analyze the
"standards controlling the technique's operation." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. "[G]eneral
observations" such as these are designed to guide the judge in reaching a decision as to
admissibility. Id. at 593. Thus, assaults on the standards controlling the polygraph's ap-
plication are still vital in determining if the evidence is to be admitted. See infra Part
IV.B (explaining that, at present, polygraph standards would fail under Daubert).
23. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-208, at 7 (1987) (questioning the theory that an
analysis of physiological stress is in any way correlated with deceptive statements);
LYKKEN, supra note 2, at 26 (arguing that there exists no physiological response unique to
lying); Benjamin Kleinmuntz & Julian J. Szucko, On the Fallibility of Lie Detection, 17 L.
& Soc'Y REV. 85, 87 (1982) ("[T]here is no reason to believe that lying produces distinc-
tive physiological changes that characterize it and only it.").
24. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: A RESEARCH REVIEW AND
EVALUATION 97 (1983) [hereinafter OTA REPORT] (citing polygraph studies that re-
vealed validity rates of approximately 60%); 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5(B), at 14 (2d ed. 1993) (highlighting the
difficulties inherent in identifying the proper field to be used in field studies); David T.
Lykken, The Validity of Tests: Caveat Emptor, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 263, 265 (1987) (re-
vealing polygraph validity rates of only 70%). But see David C. Raskin, The Polygraph in
1986: Scientific, Professional and Legal Issues Surrounding Application and Acceptance of
Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 29, 43 (relying on studies which reveal poly-
graph results of 95% in accuracy upon compliance with certain conditions).
25. See, e.g., Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 989 (noting that there is "no one spe-
cific technique or test that is used for psychophysiological credibility assessment");
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on juries,2 and the time squandered in determining admissibility. In
addition, the trial judge still must consider Frye's general acceptance test
21in reaching his final determination.
This Comment examines the admissibility of polygraph evidence in
light of Daubert. First, this Comment describes the function, techniques,
and theoretical notions behind the polygraph machine itself. Second,
this Comment examines the prior history of the polygraph in the Ameri-
can judicial system, including Daubert, the decision that changed the
standards by which courts determined polygraph admissibility. Focusing
on the initial applications of Daubert, this Comment concludes that poly-
graph evidence fails the Daubert admissibility test due to unreliable rates
of error, lack of standardized examinations and examiner testing, lack of
general scientific acceptance, and problems associated with unfair jury
prejudice.
I. THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE POLYGRAPH
A. Technical Analysis of the Polygraph
The polygraph is a device that measures physiological reactions of
humans in an attempt to determine the veracity of statements they
make.2 1 It consists of an assortment of different scientific instrumentali-
ties: a pneumograph tube, a cardio-cuff,3° and a number of sensitive elec-
McCall, supra note 1, at 415 (stressing the need for national standards governing poly-
graph exams and examiners); Raskin, supra note 24, at 66 (criticizing current polygraph
standards); see also infra Part IV.B (attacking the current level of training for polygraph
examiners).
26. See Morris D. Forkosch, The Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV.
202, 229-30 (1939) (determining that polygraph evidence has a profound prejudicial im-
pact on jury decisions); Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1240 & n.319 (noting that some studies
analyzing the effects of polygraph evidence reveal prejudicial impacts on juries); Alan
Markwart & Brian E. Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Decision-
Making, 7 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 324, 324 (1979) (concluding that certain polygraph
evidence may be a crucial factor in deciding cases); see also infra Part IV.D (discussing
the application of Rule 403 to the question of polygraph admissibility).
27. See Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396 n.13 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the time
dissipated in ascertaining polygraph admissibility).
2& See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). The Court in
Daubert recognized the Frye test as one of the factors to be considered when determining
the question of expert scientific evidence admissibility. See id.
29. See, e.g., GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 217-18 (de-
fining the polygraph's function as the "recording of physiological responses");
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 206, at 373 (describing the polygraph's purpose as the re-
cording of "autonomic physiological functions"); Raskin, supra note 24, at 31 (recognizing
the function of the polygraph as the measuring of physiological reactions).
30. See H.R. REP. No. 100-208, at 3 (1987) (describing the instrumentalities of the
1251
Catholic University Law Review
trodes 1 After an examiner attaches these instruments to the subject,32
the devices continually monitor changes in respiration, blood pressure
and flow, pulse, and galvanic skin resistance (palmar sweating).3 ' As the
examiner asks questions of the subject, a polygraph chart measures the
physiological shifts produced.
Although there are many hypotheses allegedly validating the poly-
graph, the general theory rests on the notion that when a person lies, the
physiological fluctuations that the polygraph measures can be analyzed
to display deception. Proponents of the polygraph concede that no sin-
gle physiological reading is automatically indicative of deception. 36 They
believe, however, that polygraph examiners can analyze patterns of
physiological shifts to determine the veracity of statements.37 Thus, the
act of correctly ascertaining deception from the physiological results
rests entirely upon the examiner, not the polygraph itself.3"
The examiner is therefore the most essential component of the poly-
graph testing process.39 This individual is responsible for almost every
polygraph machine). A pneumograph is an instrument that records the "thoracic move-
ments or volume changes [of a subject] during respiration." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1746 (3d ed. 1961).
31. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 217.
32. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 990. The cardio-cuff is placed on the sub-
ject's arm around the bicep muscle and serves to monitor his blood pressure. See id. The
pneumograph tubes, also referred to as volumetric sensors, are attached to the subject's
chest and/or abdomen area so as to chart the individual's respiration patterns. See id.
The blood flow reading is obtained by placing a photoelectric plethysmograph on one fin-
ger of the subject. See id. Lastly, palmar sweating, also called galvanic skin resistance, is
determined by electrodes attached to the testee's fingers. See GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 217; see also infra note 33 and accompanying
text (explaining the physiological measurements of the polygraph).
33. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 217 (describing
the physiological responses measured by the polygraph). Even critics of the polygraph
concede that the instrument is effective at accurately recording these physiological reac-
tions. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 989 (explaining the basic theory behind the
polygraph and similar credibility assessment devices).
36. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 31 ("No known physiological response or pattern of
responses is unique to deception.").
37. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 218 (discussing
how a polygraph examiner analyzes the physiological responses in order, allegedly, to de-
tect deception).
38. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 31 (observing the significance of the polygraph ex-
aminer in determining a subject's veracity or dishonesty).
39. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 360 (Colo. 1981) ("[Tlhe most impor-
tant factor in the proper use of a polygraph is the ability, experience, education, and in-
tegrity of the examiner."); JOHN E. REID & FRED E. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 5
(2d ed. 1977) (describing the examiner as "the most important factor involved" in the
[Vol. 46:12471252
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variable vital to the examination's success: properly screening the sub-
ject,4 establishing a trusting relationship with the subject,41 thwarting at-
tempts to manipulate the polygraph results through physical counter-
measures, 42 stimulating physiological changes, 43 and accurately analyzing
the test results." The failure to execute properly any of the above tasks
seriously undermines the precision of the test results. 5
In addition, the examiner must conduct a pre-test interview with the
subject.46 The interview serves to introduce the subject to the science of
polygraphy and, hopefully, to instill trust in the examiner's abilities and
objectivity. 47 This pre-test screening also permits the examiner to be-
come acquainted with the subject.48 This is significant because it allows
administration of a polygraph exam); Raskin, supra note 24, at 35 (discussing the impor-
tance of the examiner's conduct during the examination). At least one commentator has
warned against relying upon polygraph examiners, due in large part to their failure to
"follow the standard procedures" and their penchant for participating in "[s]uggestive and
coercive games." Underwood, supra note 2, at 632.
40. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 218 (acknowl-
edging the importance of the examiner in assessing the subject prior to testing and in
stimulating the subject to react physiologically during testing).
41. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 35 (explaining that the examiner must maintain a
positive relationship with the subject because doubt and suspicion on the subject's part
will adversely affect the accuracy of the test).
42. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 218 (listing the
detection of countermeasures as a task of the polygraph examiner). Physical countermea-
sures are any acts undertaken by a guilty subject in an effort to distort the final polygraph
result. See id. § 8-2(C), at 230. The idea is "to create reactions to the control questions
stronger than the reactions that occurred when [the individual] lied to the relevant ques-
tions." Raskin, supra note 24, at 51. Spontaneous countermeasures, or those attempted
without special training, have proven to be unsuccessful in defeating the polygraph ma-
chine. See id.
However, individuals given minimal training in certain physical countermeasures have
been remarkably successful in producing false negative results. See id.; see also
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(C), at 230; Lykken, supra note 24, at
267 (discussing the prevalence of easily learned countermeasures). Simple examples in-
clude biting the tongue or pressing one's toes to the floor during questioning so as to in-
fluence the physiological measurements transcribed on the polygraph chart. See Raskin,
supra note 24, at 51.
43. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 218.
44. See id. (listing the various tasks of the examiner in polygraph testing).
45. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 35 (noting the importance of the examiner in arriv-
ing at an accurate test result).
46. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 219 (discussing the
importance of a pre-test interview).
47. See id. The pre-test interview is also vital because it gives the examiner an op-
portunity to recognize any physical or mental disabilities of the subject. See id. Failure to
recognize such infirmities may lead to skewed test results. See Raskin, supra note 24, at
35; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of polygraph
tests).
48. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 219.
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the examiner to formulate a means of questioning that will best ensure
accurate results.4 1 It also grants the examiner a chance to determine if
any physical or psychological infirmities of the subject may impact the
validity of the test.5 A poor pre-test interview increases the risk of errorand decreases the chance of accuracy.5'
B. Polygraph Techniques and Scoring Methods
The theories that support polygraphy can best be explained by ana-
lyzing the different techniques employed by examiners. 2 Currently, only
three tests are utilized to any great extent: the relevant-irrelevant tech-
nique, 3 the control question technique (CQT), and the directed lie con-
trol question technique.5
The relevant-irrelevant test is the oldest polygraph technique still in
use today. 6 This method assumes that a stronger physiological response
will be produced when a subject answers a relevant question deceptively
than when the subject responds to any other relevant or irrelevant query
truthfully. 7 According to this theory, the greater the physiological re-
49. See id. According to Giannelli and Imwinkelried, the subject actually assists the
examiner in the formulation of the questions to be asked during the examination. See id.
50. See REID & INBAU, supra note 39, at 233, 247 (describing how information per-
taining to physical ailments or low intelligence may alter the validity of a test result).
51. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 35. According to Raskin, "psychologically insensi-
tive and abusive" examiners often conduct polygraph tests. Id. Such practitioners pro-
foundly impact the subject's state of mind, frequently resulting in inaccurate exam results.
See id. In addition, some examiners simply ignore standard testing procedures, choosing
instead to rely on their subjective interpretations of the subject's demeanor in arriving at
their final conclusions. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 632.
52. See generally Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 989 (noting that the many decep-
tion detection tests rest upon different rationales).
53. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 32-33. The relevant-irrelevant theory rests upon
the notion that false responses to "crime-relevant" questions will produce a stronger
physiological reaction than other questions answered truthfully. Id.
54. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 990-92 (describing the control question
technique).
55. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 885 (D.N.M. 1995) (describing
the directed lie control question technique). The concealed knowledge test (CKT) is an-
other form of polygraph testing currently administered in some areas. See Honts &
Quick, supra note 3, at 992. This test relies upon the examiner to ascertain if the subject
has knowledge of any facts which only the perpetrator of the crime would know. See id.
Although used in Japan and Israel, few American agencies or criminal justice systems
employ the CKT. See id.
56. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 990. For a brief discussion of the scientific
community's views on the relevant-irrelevant technique, see Raskin, supra note 24, at 33-
34 (finding that most scientists reject the technique for use in criminal cases).
57. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 32. Raskin illustrates the theory behind the rele-
vant-irrelevant technique with an example. See id. If Y exerts a stronger physiological
[Vol. 46:12471254
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sponse, the greater the chance that the subject is lying." Although still
employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and some local gov-
ernment agencies, the technique is subject to a very high rate of error. 9
Most disturbing is its tendency to manifest a large percentage of false
positive errors, or errors that tend to show a truthful person has lied.W°
As a result, very few individuals consider the relevant-irrelevant tech-
nique to be an accurate form of polygraph testing."'
The most popular form of testing is the CQT.62 Here, the examiner
asks three different types of questions: neutral, control, and relevant
questions.63 The neutral questions are asked to ascertain the subject's
chart readings when answering honestly." The control questions are in-
tentionally stress-inducing, designed to elicit a sharp increase in the sub-
ject's physiological response." Control questions usually are closely re-
lated to the type of crime of which the subject is accused,6 and are
reaction when answering "Did you shoot X?" than when asked "Is your name Y?", then
the examiner assumes deception. Id.
58. See id. It should be remembered when evaluating the authenticity of these theo-
ries that no one has ever proven that any one physiological response is automatically in-
dicative of deception. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining that even
polygraph proponents concede that no single physiological reading is automatically in-
dicative of deception).
59. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 31-32 (commenting on the shortcomings of the rele-
vant-irrelevant technique).
60. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 990. Polygraph examinations may result in
two different types of error. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 33, 42. The first is a false posi-
tive error, or an error where a truthful response is deemed to be untruthful. See id. at 42.
The second is a false negative error, or a mistake which labels an untruthful test subject as
being honest. See id.
61. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 990. In their 1995 study on the state of the
polygraph, Honts and Quick's cursory analysis of the relevant-irrelevant technique con-
cludes that it is "now generally considered to be invalid because it produces an extremely
high false positive rate." Id. But see Gordon H. Barland, The Polygraph Test in the USA
and Elsewhere, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES, TRUTHS AND SCIENCE 73, 80 (Anthony
Gale ed., 1988) (arguing that the relevant-irrelevant technique may be helpful in detect-
ing truth from falsehoods).
62. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 990 (identifying the control question test as
the most popular in the United States).
63. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 221 (providing ex-
amples of the three types of questions asked by the examiner during the control question
technique).
64. See id. For example, a subject would be asked, "Is this paper white?" when it
clearly was in fact white. See id. The subject would answer in the affirmative, and the
examiner would have a physiological readout relating how the individual responds when
answering truthfully. See id.
65. See McCall, supra note 1, at 378.
66. See David C. Raskin, Science, Competence, and Polygraph Techniques, CRIM.
DEF., May-June 1981, at 11, 13 (demonstrating the principle that a control question is to
be of a similar subject matter as the crime charged against the subject); see also
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designed to result in an untruthful response." The polygraph measures
the stress produced by the uncertainty of how to answer the control
question.68 Finally, relevant questions are those that go directly to the
issue at hand.69
Upon completion of the oral component of the test, the examiner
compares the physiological readings of all the questions, but examines
more closely the physiological responses of the subject during the rele-
vant and control questions." The control question theory posits that a
truthful individual will more likely exhibit a stronger physiological reac-
tion to the control questions, while a deceptive individual is more prone
to respond physiologically to the relevant questions.7 Despite its popu-
larity, the scientific community is still divided regarding the reasonable-
ness of the principles that underlie the CQT technique."
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 221 (stating that "[c]ontrol
questions concern 'an act of wrongdoing of the same general nature as the main incident
under investigation"') (citing Reid & Inbau's Truth and Deception). The question, "Did
you ever intentionally harm another human being?" could serve as a control question for
one accused of assault. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at
221. This control question is usually designed so that it would be virtually impossible to
answer the question in the negative. See id. The examiner, however, actually must influ-
ence the examination in such a way that the subject feels as if he has no choice but to lie
and answer "no" to the question. See id.; see also Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 991
(explaining the purpose behind the control question technique).
67. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 221. Prior to con-
ducting the polygraph test, the examiner tells the subject that honest answers to the con-
trol questions are of the utmost importance. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 991.
However, the examiner is actually attempting to maneuver the subject into answering the
control questions falsely in order to create a greater physiological response. See id.
68. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 221.
69. See id. If X was accused of raping Y, then the relevant question to X would be
"Did you rape Y?" See id.
70. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 34-37. As described, heightened physiological
readings during relevant questions are indicative of deception. See id. at 34.
71. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 221. This theory
rests on the notion that the greater the threat a question poses to an individual, the
greater the physiological response. See id. If the subject is guilty of the crime charged,
the relevant question should elicit a greater physiological shift. See id. Likewise, if the
individual is innocent, the control question, and not the relevant question, should produce
the higher physiological change. See id.
72. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 991. There has been no general consensus in
the scientific community regarding the notion that the CQT or any other technique can
accurately detect deception. See Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 23, at 87 (attacking
the general theory behind the polygraph that "lying produces distinctive physiological
changes"). In addition, at least one commentator has noted that the control question
technique is not easily implemented because "it is extremely difficult to devise control
questions that would ensure the eliciting of stronger reactions in an innocent person than
would the relevant questions relating to the crime of which they had been accused." Ray
H. Bull, What Is the Lie-detection Test?, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES, TRUTH AND
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The third form of polygraph testing used today is known as the di-
rected lie control question technique.73 According to polygraph expert
Dr. David Raskin, the directed lie test rests upon the same theory as the
CQT, but is less complex and easier to use.74 After the subject is admin-
istered a test in which he is told to lie, the examiner tells the individual
that these responses can be used as a baseline to determine the veracity
of future statements.7 The theory is that a guilty subject thus will be-
come overly concerned during relevant questions, believing the exam-
iner will know when he or she is lying.76 The chart readings, if the subject
is lying, allegedly will soar at this point.77 Those who are innocent, how-
ever, will show a greater physiological reaction to the control questions
(or directed lie questions) for the same reason as in the control question
technique.7 ' As with the CQT, the results are compared to determine
the truthfulness of the subject.79 The directed lie technique is considered
easier to employ because it does not require as much psychological ma-
nipulation of the subject."
Regardless of whether the examiner employs the CQT or the directed
lie control question technique, the subject is usually responsible for
scoring the results of the test.81 The most widely used systems involve
numerical evaluations that factor in only the subject's chart readings."
SCIENCE 10, 14 (Anthony Gale ed., 1988).
73. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 885 (D.N.M. 1995). The Gal-
breth court relied upon the expert testimony of Dr. David C. Raskin in finding the di-
rected lie control technique a more popular method of testing. See id.
74. See iL (describing Dr. David Raskin's theory of the directed lie test).




78. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the theory behind the con-
trol question technique).
79. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 885. Just as in the CQT, the examiner compares the
physiological measurements of the relevant and control (directed lie) questions in order
to determine if the subject is being truthful or dishonest. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 36. In some circumstances, more than one exam-
iner may score the chart readings. See id. at 39. Also, a computerized system of scoring
has been developed whose primary benefit is its complete objectivity. See id. at 40.
82. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(B), at 223. The oldest
method of scoring was known as global evaluation. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 37.
There, the examiner would analyze not only the chart measurements but also the facts of
the case and his or her subjective impressions of the subject's demeanor to arrive at a
score. See id. The global method is not widely used today, and has been referred to as
"inferior" by at least one polygraph authority. Id. For most numerical scoring systems,
examiners classify individuals who score plus six or higher as being truthful, while scores
of negative six and below signal deception. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra
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The glaring weakness of examiner numerical scoring is that qualified
"experts" in polygraphy may analyze the same physiological results and
arrive at completely different conclusions." This unacceptable result has
led many to favor a completely new form of numerical scoring that uses a
computer to evaluate test results.8
II. THE QUESTION OF POLYGRAPH ADMISSIBILITY: FROM FRYE To
DA UBERT
A. Frye v. United States: The General Scientific Acceptance Test
Prior to 1993, the standard for determining the admissibility of most
expert scientific evidence was the general acceptance test described in
Frye v. United States." Frye was the first case to confront the issue of lie
detector" admissibility.87 This seemingly insignificant three-page deci-
sion became the touchstone for not only the admissibility of polygraph
note 24, § 8-2(B), at 223. Scores between negative six and plus six are considered incon-
clusive. See id
83. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 40. In the case of Floyd Fay, five different poly-
graph examiners tested Fay and disagreed with each other's test results. See id. at 39-40.
At trial, two different examiners characterized Fay as having lied during the polygraph
tests, and he was convicted of murder. See id. The polygraph evidence comprised almost
the entire case against the defendant. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 113 (1987). The
tests were later proven to have been "incorrectly interpreted." Id. Fay eventually was
freed some two years after his arrest when the actual murderers were apprehended. See
Adrian Cimerman, The Fay Case, CRIM. DEF., May-June 1981, at 7, 10. Had the state of
Ohio not repealed its death penalty in 1978, Fay very likely would have been executed
prior to his release. See Bedau & Radelet, supra, at 113.
84. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 40. In the standard numerical scoring approach, the
examiner compares the physiological readings of the subject during the relevant and con-
trol portions of the test. See id. at 37. Each comparison is assigned a score by the exam-
iner. See id. In the computer assisted method of scoring, the physiological fluctuations
(galvanic skin resistance or blood pressure) are separated into their individual measure-
ments and automatically read into the computer. See id. at 40 n.32. A series of calcula-
tions designed to balance the importance of each measurement takes place, resulting in a
single discriminant score. See id This score is then entered into a theorem designed to
predict the probability of the subject's truthfulness. See id.
85. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1205 (character-
izing Frye as the dominant standard when determining the admissibility of expert scien-
tific testimony). As Frye became the standard for the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony in general, it was most consistently applied in cases involving polygraph testi-
mony. See Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissi-
bility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 884 (1982) [hereinafter Scientific Evidence].
86. See McCall, supra note 1, at 366; see also infra note 89 (describing the systolic
blood pressure machine at issue in Frye).
87. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
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results, but also the standard for the admissibility of expert scientific evi-
dence in general.m
In Frye, the petitioner appealed a conviction of second degree murder,
contending that the lower court erred in excluding testimony by an ex-
pert who used systolic blood pressure measurements to conduct decep-
tion testing." In upholding the decision to exclude the testimony, the
appellate court recognized that there existed a "twilight zone" that sepa-
rated experimental theories from scientifically proven principles.9° An-
nouncing the test of general acceptance, the court concluded that an ex-
perimental theory becomes scientific fact only when it is "sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."91 General acceptance may be shown by producing sci-
entific publications, judicial decrees, or testimony from scientific peers
vouching for the theory at issue?" Thus, to gain admittance, the court
required that expert scientific evidence be generally accepted by the re-
lated scientific community."
B. Attacking the Question of Polygraph Admissibility
In the seventy years between Frye and Daubert, most jurisdictions
grappled with the question of polygraph admissibility.94 Prior to 1973,
88. See Scientific Evidence, supra note 85, at 884 (noting the frequent application of
Frye to the question of polygraph admissibility); see also Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1205
(describing Frye as the primary test in gauging the admissibility of expert scientific testi-
mony).
89. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013. The basic premise behind the test applied in Frye was
that "utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood
pressure." Id. at 1014. By analyzing the blood pressure fluctuations, an examiner could
allegedly determine when a subject spoke falsehoods. See id.
90. See id. at 1014.
91. Id. In an oft-quoted passage, the court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs.
Id.
92. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 203, at 363.
93. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing
the admission of polygraph evidence due to special circumstances); State v. Valdez, 371
P.2d 894, 900 (Ariz. 1962) (allowing polygraph evidence to be admitted pursuant to
signed stipulation); Commonwealth v. Vitello, 381 N.E.2d 582, 596-97 (Mass. 1978) (par-
tially overruling a previous contradictory case and holding that polygraph evidence was
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federal and state courts almost unanimously refused to admit the results
of polygraph' tests.95 It was clear that the courts were not yet ready to
allow the "electrical-oath helper" to invade the criminal justice system.96
1. The Majority Rule: Inadmissibility
From 1973 to 1993, federal courts and many state courts simply ap-
plied the Frye test and decided that the lack of general acceptance was
sufficient to warrant exclusion of polygraph evidence.97 Others courts,
while still denying the results' entrance into trial, noted the test's unreli-
ability" or tendency to waste time.99
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit crystallized
many of these anti-polygraph arguments in United States v. Alexander.1
In Alexander, the issue was whether the lower court erred in refusing to
inadmissible to prove guilt in the Government's case-in-chief), overruled in part by Com-
monwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 185
(Mo. 1980) (upholding a per se rule of inadmissibility).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar-Gaeta, 447 F.2d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1971) (re-
fusing to admit polygraph evidence); Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir.
1958) (adopting a per se rule of inadmissibility); United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833, 841
(2d Cir. 1957) (same); Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 479 (Alaska 1970) (declaring a need
for further proof of reliability before accepting polygraph evidence); Kaminski v. State, 63
So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1952) (holding lie detection testimony inadmissible); see also McCall,
supra note 1, at 375 (discussing the general consensus of inadmissibility for polygraph
evidence in the wake of Daubert).
96. United States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1972). In Jenkins, one is-
sue involved the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Id. The defendant, Robert Jenkins,
underwent a private polygraph examination in order to prove his innocence. See id.
When this experimental test, referred to by the court as a "dry run," exculpated Jenkins,
he attempted to force the prosecution into stipulating to another polygraph exam con-
ducted by an operator of the Government's choice. See id. When the Government re-
fused, Jenkins sought to introduce the results of his practice test into trial. See id. The
trial judge refused the evidence, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See id.
97. See, e.g., Marks, 260 F.2d at 382 (applying the Frye test and flatly denying admis-
sibility); Kaminski, 63 So. 2d at 340 (citing Frye in denying admissibility to lie detector
evidence); People v. Welke, 68 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Mich. 1955) (reaffirming Michigan's re-
fusal to allow polygraph evidence into trials).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820, 824 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981). In Helton,
the Air Force Court of Military Review rejected the proffered polygraph testimony until
such time that "it [could] be demonstrated that the opinion testimony resulting from
polygraph testing [was] generally more reliable than the court-martial fact-finder in de-
termining truthfulness." Id.
99. See Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986). In Brown, the district
court entertained oral arguments on the admissibility issue and examined the detailed
opinions of five polygraph experts. See id. Attorneys for both sides then spent two days
of testimony in front of the jury detailing the intricacies of their polygraph positions. See
id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the precious judicial resources consumed in an earlier
trial could be conserved in future cases with a per se rule of inadmissibility. See id.
100. 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
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allow a defendant to introduce favorable polygraph evidence at trial."'
The court first applied the Frye general acceptance test and found that
the unreliable nature of polygraph evidence precluded its admittance.
In addition, the court relied heavily on the highly prejudicial impact that
the testimony would likely have on the jury. 10 3 For these reasons, the
court affirmed the lower court decision to exclude the proffered test re-
sults.1
4
As time passed, distinctions among jurisdictions and even within juris-
dictions became more common."0 5 Many courts continued to adhere to a
per se rule of inadmissibility."O6 While maintaining a steadfast rule
101. See id. at 162. At trial, the police claimed that the defendant, Steven Alexander,
attempted to conceal a weapon as he stepped from his car. See id. Alexander vehemently
denied the accusation. See id.
102. See id. at 166. The court cited not only the high rate of error associated with the
polygraph, but also a lack of confidence in the examiners who conduct the tests. See id.
103. See id. at 168. The court found that the polygraph evidence would threaten the
jury's traditional role as factfinders:
When polygraph evidence is offered in evidence at trial, it is likely to be
shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Del-
phi .... To the extent that the polygraph results are accepted as unimpeachable
or conclusive by jurors, despite cautionary instructions by the trial judge, the ju-
rors' traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the facts and adjudge guilt
or innocence is preempted.
Id.
104. See id. at 170.
105. Compare United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding
that it was within the discretion of the trial judge to admit or deny polygraph evidence),
with United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180, 182 (4th Cir. 1984) (relying upon a per se
rule of inadmissibility to prevent the inclusion of polygraph testimony). The Massachu-
setts state courts similarly waffled over admissibility standards. Compare Commonwealth
v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Mass. 1974) (allowing polygraph evidence in limited
circumstances despite its failure to meet the Frye standard), overruled in part by Com-
monwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989), with Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547
N.E.2d 35, 41 (Mass. 1989) (overruling A Juvenile based on the polygraph's failure to de-
velop into a reliable scientific tool). Differing opinions among the federal circuits did not
lead to a general consensus on the question of polygraph admittance. Compare Wolfel v.
Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1987) (admitting expert polygraphic testimony if
the evidence was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial), with United States v. Hilton, 772
F.2d 783, 785 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusing to admit polygraph test results for any reason).
Such divergent views contribute to a confused legal landscape.
106. The First, Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits have upheld a com-
plete exclusion of all polygraph evidence. See, e.g., deVries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 716 F.2d 939, 945 (1st Cir. 1983) (excluding expert polygraph testimony and ques-
tioning its scientific value); United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (re-
fusing to admit polygraph testimony because it lacked scientific reliability); United States
v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (acknowledging unity among the federal
circuits in their rejection of polygraph testimony); United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833,
841 (2d Cir. 1957) (refusing to admit polygraph evidence due to its unreliability).
Virtually all state courts refused to admit polygraph test results as well. See, e.g., Peo-
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against admittance, some courts left unanswered the question of future
admissibility in the event of technical advancements in polygraphy.'
0 7
Other courts decided to allow polygraph testimony only when the parties
stipulated to its use before trial.' 8 Some courts, instead of applying a per
se rule of inadmissibility, stated that the admissibility decision rested
within the discretion of the trial judge."9 Despite the disparity regarding
which standard to apply, polygraph testimony was still inadmissible in a
majority of jurisdictions."'
2. The Minority View: Attempts at Admissibility
In 1975, New Mexico broke from the norm, becoming the only juris-
diction to embrace polygraph results fully,"' complete with a rule of evi-
dence, Rule 707, that detailed the criteria for admittance."' In State v.
Dorsey,"' the New Mexico Supreme Court overruled earlier precedent
that required signed stipulations as a prerequisite to polygraph admissi-
pie v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354, 361 (Colo. 1981) (excluding polygraph test results from
trials); State v. Mitchell, 402 A.2d 479, 482 (Me. 1979) (employing a per se 'rule of inad-
missibility); Jones v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 247, 248 (Va. 1974) (refusing to admit
polygraph evidence).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 622 F.2d 917, 917 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed that it would be willing to reconsider the issue of polygraph admissibility, pro-
vided a party proffered "evidence tending to show advances in the state of polygraph art."
Id.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1975) (prohibiting
polygraph test results absent a signed stipulation by both parties); State v. Souel, 372
N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (Ohio 1978) (admitting stipulated polygraph results provided certain
requirements are met); Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445, 458 (Wyo. 1977) (accepting stipu-
lated polygraph testimony when certain "foundational" requirements are met).
109. See Webster, 639 F.2d at 186. The court in Webster held it was within the trial
court's discretion to determine the admissibility of polygraph test results. Id. The court
followed the weight of national authorities and refused to admit the polygraph evidence.
See id.
110. See McCall, supra note 1, at 375 (explaining that the majority of appellate opin-
ions between Frye and Daubert denied the admission of polygraph results).
111. See State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204, 204-05 (N.M. 1975).
112. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-707 (Michie 1995). Passed by the New Mexico Su-
preme Court, this rule of evidence was more strict than the requirements of Dorsey. See
McCall, supra note 1, at 386-87. The evidence could now only be used to impeach or cor-
roborate certain witness testimony. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-707(C). To prevent
abuses, the court required either an audio or visual recording of the entire polygraph ex-
amination. See id. § 11-707(E). The examiner, in addition to adequately proving his
qualifications, had to follow a number of requirements as established in other provisions
of the code. See id. § 11-707(B). The party seeking to introduce the evidence was re-
quired to give thirty days written notice to the opposition, including copies of the poly-
graph charts and any previous test results. See id. § 11-707(D). Lastly, the rule declared
witnesses could not be forced to undergo a polygraph examination. See id. § 11-707(G);
see also McCall, supra note 1, at 385-88 (analyzing New Mexico's statute).
113. 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975).
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bility." 4 The court established three requirements in order for a poly-
graph test to be admitted into evidence. 15 First, the polygraph examiner
must be well-qualified.1 6 Second, the reliability of the machine must be
proven by authorities in the field to be adequate."' Lastly, the test made
on the subject must be valid."8
In addition to New Mexico, two other states experimented with a pol-
icy admitting polygraph testimony."9 A California decision, Witherspoon
v. Superior Court," attempted to follow suit, but was overridden when
the California state legislature intervened and refused to admit poly-
graph evidence or any other testimony pertaining to a polygraph exami-
nation, unless stipulated to by the parties. 2' Massachusetts also tinkered
with the idea of polygraph admissibility," only to overrule its experi-
ment some thirteen years later due to the polygraph's failure to develop
into a reliable scientific tool.' 3
114. See id. at 205.
115. See id. The trial court was left to make the determination as to whether or not a
party had sufficiently met these three burdens. See id.
116. See id. Unfortunately, the court did not state any minimum qualifications for de-
termining which examiners were well-qualified. See id.
117. See id The court chose to rely upon the testimony of "authorities in the field" to
determine the machine's reliability. Id.
118. See id.
119. See Witherspoon v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1982); Com-
monwealth v. A Juvenile, 348 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1976).
120. 183 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1982). In Witherspoon, the court criticized the
"'knee jerk' response[s]" of jurisdictions applying Frye that automatically excluded the
polygraph testimony. Id. at 618. The court found that "no sound legal basis" existed for a
per se rule of inadmissibility, and allowed polygraph evidence into trial subject to the
judge's discretion. Id. at 620-21. In upholding the basic theory behind polygraphy, the
Witherspoon court compared a polygraph machine to the detection skills of any observant
human, finding the polygraph to be nothing more than a more finely tuned deception de-
tector. Id. at 621. In making this comparison, the court stated, "[who... can honestly
say that they have never experienced the rapid breathing, sweating in the palms of the
hands and the feeling of 'flushing' in the face connected with an attempt to deceive[?]"
Id.
121. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 351.1 (West 1996) (denying admissibility to polygraph
testimony in criminal trials absent stipulation by both parties).
122. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120, 124 (Mass. 1974) (allowing for
limited admissibility provided a number of stringent requirements were met), overruled in
part by, Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35 (Mass. 1989).
123. See Commonwealth v. Mendes, 547 N.E.2d 35, 41 (Mass. 1989). In 1989, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-evaluated the A Juvenile decision which al-
lowed for limited admissibility of polygraph testimony. See id at 36. The court recog-
nized that the admission of polygraph testimony has always been problematic: its reliance
upon examiners; the subjective nature of the testing; the unreliability of test results; the
opportunity for jury confusion and prejudice; the possibility of usurping the role of the
jury; and the extra weight it placed on trial judges. See id at 41. In overruling A Juvenile,
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While most jurisdictions were not so liberal, 4 as the polygraph began
to be perceived as more reliable, two federal circuit courts which had
been staunchly opposed to admitting polygraph testimony reconsidered
their per se rules of inadmissibility.1 5 These courts permitted polygraph
evidence if special circumstances existed.1 16 Sensing that the trend in the
federal circuits was toward an abolition of the per se rule, the Eleventh
Circuit took a large step toward admitting polygraph results in United
States v. Piccinonna.27
In Piccinonna, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit chose to
allow the introduction of polygraph evidence at trial.' 2 The sole issue
was the admissibility of the defendant's expert polygraph testimony. 9 In
a comprehensive opinion, the Piccinonna court analyzed polygraph
standards and procedures, determining that the polygraph was a reliable
and beneficial instrument.' 3° The court outlined two instances in which
the evidence would be admissible. 31 The first was in the case of stipula-
the court expressed its views regarding the current and future states of polygraphy:
[T]he evidentiary shortcomings of polygraphy have not been alleviated in the
slightest way. In addition, it is clear from the extensive record in this case and
the available literature that our hope that polygraphy would mature to the point
of general scientific acceptance has not materialized. Further hope or expecta-
tion in that regard is no longer warranted.
Id.
124. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the per se rules of inadmis-
sibility in many jurisdictions).
125. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding
that polygraph evidence may be admissible to rebut assertions that a confession was co-
erced); United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 1987) (relying on Kampiles to
admit polygraph evidence).
126. See Wolfel v. Holbrook, 823 F.2d 970, 972 (6th Cir. 1987). In Wolfel, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found polygraph testimony to be admissible
provided the proffered evidence passed a two-pronged test. Id. The trial court must first
determine whether the proffered testimony is relevant. See id. Next, if relevant, the
court may admit the evidence only if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact.
See id.
127. 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
128. See id. at 1536.
129. See id. at 1530. The defendant, Julio Piccinonna, claimed that the trial judge
erred in refusing to admit polygraph testimony that would have buttressed his plea of in-
nocence. See id.
130. See id. at 1535. The court noted that improved reliability, combined with evi-
dence tending to show that juries were not swayed by polygraph testimony, led to the
conclusion that a per se rule of inadmissibility was improper. See id. The court failed to
cite any source supporting the proposition that juries were not influenced by exam results.
131. See id. The court's test applied only if the proffered testimony was relevant to
resolving an issue of fact. See id. at 1531. If not relevant, then the evidence was inadmis-
sible under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 402.
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tion."3 The second was in situations in which the testimony was to be
used to impeach or corroborate a witness at trial.'33
In the latter instance, the testimony could be used only if three condi-
tions were met prior to trial.'-" First, the party using the evidence must
give adequate notice to the opposing party. 135 Next, the opposing party
must be given a reasonable time to initiate its own polygraph examina-
tion by a qualified expert. Lastly, testimony that otherwise violated the
Federal Rules of Evidence would be inadmissible. 37 These three condi-
tions were designed to minimize the danger of unfair prejudice.1
31
A strong dissent attacked the Piccinonna majority, questioning the
theory behind polygraphy,' 39 detailing the effectiveness of countermea-
sures, 140 and citing low polygraph reliability rates.'41 The dissent also ob-
jected on the grounds that the introduction of polygraph evidence would
132. See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id The court never defined the term "adequate notice." Id
136. See id. The determination of what constituted a reasonable opportunity for an
opposition's expert to conduct a similar polygraph examination was apparently left within
the discretion of the court. See id.
137. See id For example, it would violate the Federal Rules to include evidence that
was considered irrelevant pursuant to Rule 402 or hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(c). See
FED. R. EVID. 402, 801(c).
138. See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1536. The Piccinonna court was most concerned with
potential violations of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. Under Rule 403,
the court applies a balancing test in which evidence is excluded if its "probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 403. The
court sought to admit polygraph evidence only when the potential for prejudice was re-
duced. See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1537. This prejudicial impact often served as the pri-
mary reason for the exclusion of the evidence. See Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396
(9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the polygraph's "overwhelming potential for prejudice").
139. See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1537-42 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). The dissent illuminated the controversy in the scientific community over
whether the physiological responses the polygraph measured were actual indicators of
deception. See id at 1539.
140. See id. at 1538. The dissenting opinion cited the OTA Report in concluding that
countermeasures could be successful in producing invalid polygraph test results. See id.
141. See id at 1540. The opinion referred to the results of six prior field studies. See
id. In them, false positive rates averaged 19.1%, false negative rates averaged 10.2%, and
average guilty detection averaged 86.3%. See id. False negative errors occur when the
polygraph results incorrectly label a dishonest person as one telling the truth. See supra
note 60 and accompanying text. False positive errors result when the examiner incor-
rectly classifies a truthful individual as being deceitful. See supra note 60 and accompa-
nying text.
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have a tremendously prejudicial impact on the jury.142 These arguments
remain persuasive today.'
43
3. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975.'44 In
determining the issue of polygraph admissibility, only two rules are of
considerable importance: Rule 702, dealing with expert testimony,' 5 and
Rule 403, pertaining to the exclusion of relevant evidence on the basis of
unfair prejudice."'6 Rule 702 allows experts to testify in both opinion and
non-opinion form in order to assist the trier of fact in resolving issues in
dispute.' 7 While at least one court interpreted Rule 702 to signal the end
of the Frye general acceptance test,'4 Congress made no reference in the
rule itself nor in the attached Advisory Committee's Note that Rule 702
was intended to displace Frye.14' Rule 403 demands that relevant evi-
142. See Piccinonna, 885 F.2d at 1541. Such objections rest upon the belief that the
polygraph examiner's testimony will be accepted without question by the jury. See id.; see
also infra notes 283-99 and accompanying text (discussing the potential prejudice of poly-
graph testimony); see also infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text (describing the dif-
ferences between polygraph testimony and other forms of expert evidence admissible in
court).
143. See generally infra Part IV (describing the many compelling reasons for exclud-
ing polygraph evidence under Daubert).
144. The Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88
Stat. 1926, 1926-49 (1975). President Gerald Ford signed the Federal Rules into law some
six months prior, on January 2, 1975. See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL xxv (6th ed. 1994).
145. See FED. R. EVID. 702; see also supra note 14 (providing the text of Rule 702).
146. FED. R. EVID. 403. The complete rule states: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
147. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
148. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198, 1200 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978).
149. In holding that Rule 702 was the appropriate standard with which to determine
the admissibility of alleged scientific evidence, the Supreme Court stressed that both the
rule itself and the legislative history of the rule make no reference to the Frye test of gen-
eral acceptance. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). The
fact that Frye was not mentioned was an indicator to the Court that Rule 702 was drafted
simply to replace the general acceptance test. See id. It seems more reasonable, however,
to presume that the inverse of this argument is true: that because Frye was not alluded to,
the omission is a signal that the drafters of the Federal Rules intended it to be left un-
touched.
A close analysis of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee's Notes, amendments, and
legislative histories bolsters this argument. It is clear when studying these histories that
the Rules' drafters often intentionally included the leading cases that were to be over-
turned upon passage of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory com-
mittee's note ("The final sentence constitutes a rejection of the doctrine of such cases as
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dence be prohibited if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
any one of six listed bases for exclusion.5 ' Since these bases must "sub-
stantially outweigh" the evidence's probative value for exclusion to re-
sult, Rule 403 operates under a presumption of admissibility.' None-
theless, numerous cases have cited Rule 403 when excluding polygraph
testimony from trial.5'
C. Altering the Frye Standard: Daubert
The Frye test of general scientific acceptance, some seventy years old,
continued to provide a model for analyzing the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence until 1993.113 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.'" allowed the Supreme Court to alter this historic standard.' The
Court granted certiorari solely to re-evaluate the validity of the general
acceptance test.'56 The Court held that Rule 702 and the rest of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, not the Frye test, are the standards for deter-
mining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony at trial.
5 7
People v. Sorge .... "); FED. R. EVID. 609(a). (1990 Amendment) (citing two federal cir-
cuit court cases before stating "[tihis approach also is rejected by the amendment"); FED.
R. EVID. 613(a) advisory committee's note (rejecting the doctrine of The Queen's Case,
leading precedent on the subject of examining witnesses with prior statements). Since the
Frye test was such a popular standard for determining the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony, it seems logical that had the Federal Rules drafters intended Frye to be dis-
placed, they would have incorporated it into Rule 702's history.
150. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also supra note 146 (listing the grounds).
151. See SALTZBURG, supra note 144, at 217. Despite this presumption, because of
the potential prejudice inherent in admitting expert testimony, Daubert granted trial
judges undertaking 403 analyses "'more control over experts than over lay witnesses."'
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (citation omitted). In-
deed, some have predicted that trial courts will more assertively apply Rule 403 to ex-
clude relevant expert testimony, "especially where the testimony is based on questionable
methodology." See SALTZBURG, supra note 144, at 223.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding
polygraph results excludable under Rule 403), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); United
States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that polygraph evidence is in-
admissible under Rule 403 because of its potential to mislead and confuse the jury), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343 (1996); Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 662-63 (6th Cir. 1994)
(excluding polygraph results because of their prejudicial influence on the jury); Palmer v.
City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding a lower court decision
to exclude polygraph testimony because its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative
value).
153. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
154. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
155. See id. at 585.
156. See id. at 582. The court began the opinion by stating that, "[iun this case we are
called upon to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a fed-
eral trial." Id.
157. See id. at 588; see also supra note 14 (providing the full text of Rule 702).
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In Daubert, two families brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals alleging that the mothers' ingestion of the drug Bendectin caused
severe birth defects in their children.158 An expert for Dow testified to
the scientifically accepted view that Bendectin was never found to in-
crease the risk of human birth defects when taken in the first trimester of
pregnancy.59 The plaintiffs responded by proffering the testimony of
eight experts of their own, each of which sought to draw a connection
between the drug and the plaintiffs' subsequent birth defects.' 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Califor-
nia denied their proffer, holding that the lack of epidemiological studies
supporting the experts' conclusions made their testimony inadmissible. 6'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, citing Frye's
general acceptance test, affirmed."' The techniques and methodologies
the experts used in arriving at their conclusions had not yet been sub-
jected to publication and peer review and, therefore, were not generally
accepted in the scientific community.'63 Absent this general acceptance,
158. See Daubert, 509 U..S. at 582. The children, Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller,
were born with reduced limbs. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp.
570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The plaintiffs believed that Bendectin, which Dow marketed, caused these birth defects.
See id.
159. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991),
rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The expert, Doctor Steven Lamm, cited thirty published
studies chronicling Bendectin's effects on over 130,000 patients. See id. According to his
analysis, no connection could be drawn between the drug and eventual birth malforma-
tions. See id.; see also Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
160. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583. The experts each argued that scientifically valid
experiments clearly demonstrated a connection between Bendectin and birth defects in
certain animal species. See id. They also saw similarities in the chemical structures of
Bendectin and drugs already known to be causes of birth abnormalities. See id. In light
of these findings and a "reanalysis" of the previously published Bendectin statistics, they
sought to testify as to what they perceived to be an actual link between Bendectin and the
reduced limbs of Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller. See id.
161. See Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575. The lower court applied a standard set out in
an earlier Ninth Circuit case, Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir.
1989), which held that epidemiological evidence was necessary to support the admission
of certain scientific testimony. See Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575. The experts in Daubert
relied primarily upon "in vitro studies, chemical structure analyses and animal studies" to
arrive at their conclusion that Bendectin was a "teratogen," or a drug which may cause
birth defects in humans. Id. The district court found these sources were not sufficiently
based on epidemiological studies to warrant admittance. See id.
162. See Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131.
163. See id. In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily upon other circuit court
decisions that excluded expert testimony due to a lack of epidemiological testing. See
generally Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the
testimony of the expert witnesses); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (preventing the petitioners' experts from testifying); Lynch v. Merrell-
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the evidence was to be excluded.1"
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding for the first time
that the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence supplanted the Frye
test.1 6' Trial judges were to apply Rule 702 and the other Federal Rules
of Evidence, not Frye, to determine the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony at trial.166 The Court then proceeded to analyze Rule 702, the
Federal Rule concerning scientific evidence.
16 7
First, the Court detailed how the proffered testimony must be consid-
168ered "scientific knowledge" prior to admission. Such knowledge need
not be known to a certainty, but may be based merely on "good
grounds" and supported with "appropriate validation."' 69 This scientific
knowledge requirement was to serve as the standard for determining the
validity of the proposed testimony.7'
Rule 702 also required that the proffered evidence be relevant. 7' Un-
der Daubert, relevancy was measured by the closeness of the "fit" be-
tween the offered expert opinion and the facts at issue. 72 If the testi-
National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (refusing to allow certain experts to testify
due to the lack of epidemiological testing of their research).
164. See Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130.
165. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587; see also McCall, supra note 1, at 394 (stating the
consensus among commentators that in the wake of Daubert, "the Frye general accep-
tance standard is no longer the test for admissibility of scientific evidence in federal
courts").
166. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588; see also supra note 14 (providing the text of Rule
702).
167. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
168. Id. at 590. In order to be considered "scientific," the evidence must be found to
have "a grounding in the methods and procedures of science." Id. In addition, the word
"knowledge" means "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Id.
169. Id. The Court believed that the term "scientific knowledge" created a "standard
of evidentiary reliability." Id.
170. See id. In an important footnote, the Court described how scientific validity, and
not scientific reliability, was the standard which expert scientific evidence had to satisfy
prior to admission. See id. at 590-91 n.9. The distinction between the two terms is ex-
tremely important. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 264-65. The reliability of a technique
relates to "the consistency with which the test produces the same result in the same cir-
cumstances." Id. at 264. For polygraph examinations, this means the number of times
examiners will agree that the same subject's chart is indicative of guilt or innocence. See
id. at 264-65. This rate may be quite high. See id. Validity, however, is "the probability
that the test result is accurate or true." Id. at 264. Even a horoscope can be reliable, but
may not be valid. See id. at 265; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 206, at 375 (citing
critics who recognize that accuracy percentages are unsuitable indicators of validity).
171. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. Since Rule 702 contained a specific provision
dealing with relevancy, the Court chose to address only this relevancy standard of Rule
702, and not to elaborate on the general relevancy standard as given in Rule 401. See id
172. Id. The Court referred to Rule 702's relevancy requirement as a "'helpfulness'
standard" to the judge assessing admissibility. Id. at 591-92. In order to meet this crite-
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mony could assist the trier of fact in resolving an issue of the case, it was
relevant under Rule 702.171
The Court enumerated a series of general observations designed to aid
trial judges in making initial admissibility determinations.'74 While not
sine qua non factors of admissibility, 5 it was understood that lower
courts were to consider the Court's suggestions in applying Daubert.'76
In ascertaining whether the proposed testimony is scientific knowledge,
trial judges first must determine if the theory has been scientifically
tested.177 The second element considers whether others in the scientific
rion, the proffered evidence requires "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent in-
quiry," another way of saying a "fit" between the facts and the evidence being offered.
Id. at 592. A close comparison of the Court's relevancy standard for Rule 702 and the
general standard for relevancy described in Rule 401 show the two to be identical. Com-
pare FED. R. EVID. 702 (deeming evidence relevant under Rule 702 provided it assists the
trier of fact in determining a fact at issue), with FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.").
173. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. In addition, the Court upheld the usual interpreta-
tion of Rule 702 and afforded the expert a great deal of latitude with respect to those
opinions specific to his or her area of expertise. See id. at 592. It is assumed that the ex-
perts' opinions are based on more than mere conjecture or subjective feelings, a concern
when debating the admissibility of lay opinions. See id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advi-
sory committee's note ("[T]he expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person
qualified by 'knowledge, skill, experience, training or education."').
174. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court did not create these general observa-
tions to serve as prerequisites to admissibility. See id. Rather, the Court designed the
observations to guide trial court judges in analyzing an expert's testimony. See id. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in part, sharply criticized the observations. See id. at 598-99
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He referred to the sugges-
tions as "vague and abstract," especially when judges were to apply the observations to
complex areas of science far beyond the comprehension of most laymen. Id.
175. See id. at 593. The Court declared that it "[did] not presume to set out a defini-
tive checklist or test." Id.
176. See id. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that "'[gleneral observations' by this Court customarily carry
great weight with lower federal courts." Id Indeed, many of the cases that apply the
Daubert standard to the issue of polygraph admissibility refer to the Court's observations
as factors in their final determinations. See Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581, 584 (D.
Conn. 1996) (applying the five Daubert factors to the question of polygraph admissibility);
United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D.N.M. 1995) (same). With this in
mind, it will be assumed for the purposes of this Comment that the "general observa-
tions" are as much a part of the Daubert opinion as the decision to overrule the Frye test.
177. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. The Court reasoned that testing and validating hy-
potheses "distinguishe[d] science from other fields of human inquiry." Id. The opinion
went on to add that "'the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability."' Id. (citations omitted). This requirement of "falsifiability" or testing con-
cerned Chief Justice Rehnquist. In his partial dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist warned
that compelling trial court judges to partake in determining the falsifiability of scientific
theories "imposes on them either the obligation or the authority to become amateur sci-
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community have published and critiqued the proposed concept.17 1 Third,
when examining measurable scientific techniques, trial judges should
study the known rates of error.179 In addition, courts are to consider the
standards governing the use of the novel scientific theories."' Lastly, the
trial court is to appraise the theory's general acceptance, the displaced
Frye test, prior to admitting or denying the evidence. 8' The presence or
absence of any single Daubert criterion was not to be dispositive in de-
termining the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence.1 8 Al-
though admissible under Rule 702, the evidence still could be excluded if
it violated any other Federal Rule of Evidence, including the unfair
entists ...... M at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. The Court believed that a survey of the relevant scien-
tific community was important in determining "'good science"'. Id. (citation omitted).
Subjection to peer review was aimed at decreasing the likelihood of blatant errors being
pledged as scientific theories. See id.
179. See id. at 594. When applying this factor to polygraphs, it becomes apparent that
no real known rate of error can ever be ascertained. See OTA REPORT, supra note 24, at
4. According to the OTA Report, there are two reasons for this. See id. First, the com-
plex nature of the polygraph process includes a number of different factors that can vary
widely from test to test. See id. Such variables include the "individuals tested, training of
the examiner, purpose of the test, and types of questions asked." Id. Second, different
studies, many of which are scientifically valid, produce sharply contrasting results. Com-
pare Raskin, supra note 24, at 60 (approximating a 95% accuracy rate for certain lab
studies), with Lykken, supra note 24, at 264 (arriving at an average of 68.5% accuracy).
180. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. Even the most ardent supporters of the polygraph
admit that perhaps the most glaring flaw of the polygraph technique lays in the "state of
training and competence of polygraph examiners." Raskin, supra note 24, at 66; see also
Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 998. In their 1995 assessment of the polygraph, Profes-
sors Honts and Quick concluded that there existed a "poor general state of examiner
training in the polygraph profession." Id. Such conclusions take on even greater signifi-
cance in light of the vital role the polygrapher plays in the administration of the polygraph
exam. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of a
competent and properly trained examiner).
181. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. At least one lower court applying the Daubert test
has given weight to the first four general observations of the Court, while brushing aside
the factor of general acceptance. See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1360
(D. Ariz. 1995) (holding that Daubert's adoption of Rule 702 leaves little room for a gen-
eral acceptance analysis).
182. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. The Court stated that its intentions in creating
the general observations were not "to set out a definitive checklist or test." Id at 593.
Rather, it was merely to aid the trial court in ascertaining if the proffered testimony was
scientific knowledge that could aid the jury in resolving an issue of the case. See id. at
592. Nevertheless, federal judges do not treat elements as mere observations, but rather
as weighty mandates to be appraised and evaluated fully. See id. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the weight lower courts apply to
such observations); see also United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 891 (D.N.M.
1995) (holding that the Daubert factors must be considered when addressing the admissi-
bility of polygraph evidence).
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prejudice prong of Rule 403.13
Daubert concluded by addressing two issues raised by Merrell Dow.U
Merrell Dow argued that the abandonment of the Frye test would sub-
ject juries to a flood of confusing and complex scientific theories."" The
Court insisted that cross-examination and jury instructions would allow
parties to attack admissible yet questionable expert evidence.'1 Next,
Merrell Dow contended that allowing the judge to screen and evaluate
the admissibility of the expert evidence would exclude scientific theories
worthy of recognition from the trier of fact.'.. The Court, while recog-
nizing that such exclusions would occur, nonetheless believed that the
trial system required quick and speedy determinations of disputes.'
183. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96. This portion of the opinion was included as a
reminder to trial judges that there is more to admissibility than satisfying Rule 702. See
id. The most important of these rules is Rule 403, which allows trial judges to exclude
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or confusion
of the issues. See generally infra notes 283-315 and accompanying text (arguing for exclu-
sion under Rule 403).
184. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96.
185. See id. at 596. Such confusing theories would likely mislead and dazzle juries,
unjustly influencing their decisions one way or the other. See id.
186. See id. At least one court has questioned the sagacity of relying upon cross-
examinations to decrease the prejudicial effects of shaky but admissible evidence. See
United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Md. 1973). In Wilson, the court held
that the use of cross-examination for this purpose is "of dubious validity, as a rule," pri-
marily due to the fact that few attorneys are as knowledgeable as the expert in his or her
chosen field. Id. A poor cross-examination in turn causes the court to rely solely upon
the expert testimony, a risky proposition in light of the fact that experts often overstate
their testimony. See Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1238. For discussion of the ineffectiveness
of limiting instructions in lessening the prejudicial effects of expert polygraph testimony,
see infra note 307.
In addition to these solutions, the Daubert court commented that judges would still be
free to direct verdicts or grant summary judgments if the jury results conflicted with the
substantial weight of the evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S at 596. Such procedural meas-
ures would exist only in the civil, and not criminal, context. See id
187. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
18& See id. at 597. The Court acknowledged that allowing the judge to screen expert
scientific evidence would "prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and inno-
vations." Id. The Court determined, however, that time constraints necessitated that this
be the case. See id. It is interesting to note that lower courts applying Daubert have in-
terpreted it to require a fact-specific inquiry every time a party seeks to introduce poly-
graph testimony. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 881 (finding that "[s]uch scrutiny is im-
perative to a faithful application of Daubert"). Apparently this exhaustive and time-
consuming inquiry is meant to ensure the reliability of the polygraph techniques and pro-
cedures. See id. Ironically, Daubert recognizes the necessity of prompt judicial determi-
nations, while courts applying Daubert have interpreted it to require an exhaustive, fact-
specific inquiry. The contradiction appears obvious.
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Swift justice required that some scientifically valid theories be ex-
cluded."9
III. INITIAL APPLICATIONS OF DA UBERT
While it would be premature to speculate as to the full impact Daubert
will have on the question of polygraph admissibility, courts' initial appli-
cations of Daubert reveal divergent approaches and results.1" A few
courts have interpreted Daubert as requiring a complete re-evaluation of
their previous rules against admissibility.' This re-evaluation resulted in
the admission of polygraph evidence in three circuits.1 2 Another court
applied Daubert and determined that the evidence fell short of meeting
189. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. Assuming arguendo that polygraph evidence suc-
cessfully passes Daubert's interpretation of Rule 702, it seems that valid theories may be
excluded because the determination of admissibility may take too long for a trial. See
FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing for exclusion of evidence if "its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed.., by considerations of undue delay").
190. Compare Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 896 (applying the Daubert criteria and deter-
mining that polygraph evidence was admissible), with Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581,
590 (D. Conn. 1996) (utilizing the Daubert factors to flatly reject polygraph evidence).
Rather than apply Daubert and Rule 702 to questions of polygraph admissibility, at least
one circuit has utilized Rule 403 alone in refusing polygraph evidence. See United States
v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (employing Rule 403 in finding that poly-
graph evidence was too overtly prejudicial to be admitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795
(1996).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that Daubert is inconsistent with a per se rule of inadmissibility); Chatwin v. Davis
County, 936 F. Supp. 832, 838-39 (D. Utah 1996) (applying Daubert in determining that
the former circuit rule of inadmissibility was no longer acceptable); Galbreth, 908 F. Supp.
at 878 (requiring a fresh analysis of polygraph admissibility in light of Daubert); United
States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Ariz. 1995) (re-examining the question of
polygraph admissibility in light of Daubert and other factors); cf. United States v. Posado,
57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a per se rule of inadmissibility for polygraph
testimony is no longer acceptable after Daubert). In Posado, the court noted that until
this point the Fifth Circuit had recognized a per se rule of inadmissibility. Id. at 436.
Daubert, however, mandated a re-evaluation of the per se rule. See id. The Posado court
chose to rescind the per se rule of inadmissibility "with a high degree of caution" to allow
district court judges the opportunity to assess the reliability and relevance of proffered
polygraph evidence in pre-trial hearings. Id. at 429, 436. A Fifth Circuit district court,
however, later extended this holding to allow polygraph evidence at trial provided the
evidence satisfied Daubert. See Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299,
302 (W.D. La. 1995) (extending the rule set forth in Posado). Another district court in
the Fifth Circuit also applied Posado and Daubert, and determined that the proffered
polygraph evidence was inadmissible at that particular trial. See United States v. Domin-
guez, 902 F. Supp. 737,740 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
192. See, e.g., Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 896 (admitting polygraph evidence in the wake
of Daubert); Ulmer, 897 F. Supp. at 304 (applying Posado and Daubert and admitting
polygraph test results); Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1364 (allowing "polygraph evidence [if
used] for a limited purpose").
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the Daubert criteria, and failed separately under Rule 403.193 Other ju-
risdictions, while acknowledging Daubert and its applicability, chose to
ignore it and excluded proffered evidence solely on the grounds of unfair
prejudice under Federal Rule 403.194 Two other courts disregarded Dau-
bert altogether, electing instead to exclude the evidence solely under
Rule 403.195 This lack of uniformity exemplifies an obvious gap in the
treatment of polygraph evidence since Daubert. Despite the inconsistent
decisions, the potential for admitting polygraph testimony seems more
conceivable than ever before. 96 Most jurisdictions that recently rejected
the proffered polygraph testimony did not hold that the evidence was
never to be admitted.'97 Rather, these courts held that admission of
polygraph evidence under the facts as submitted would have resulted in
unfair prejudice to a party, and that the test results, therefore, were ex-
193. See Miller v. Heaven, 922 F. Supp. 495,503 (D. Kan. 1996) (determining that the
proffered polygraph evidence failed under both Daubert and Rule 403).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
the polygraph results were excludable under Rule 403), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343
(1996); Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1217 (excluding polygraph testimony solely on the basis of Rule
403); United States v. Lech, 895 F. Supp. 582, 584-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same). These
courts refused to apply Daubert for similar reasons. In Sherlin, the Sixth Circuit main-
tained that courts had the authority to exclude polygraph evidence on the basis of Rule
403, regardless of the results of a Daubert analysis. 67 F.3d at 1217. In both Kwong and
Lech, the courts decided that a Daubert analysis would be necessary provided the facts of
future cases warranted such a test. See Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668; Lech, 895 F. Supp. at 584-
86. In both instances, the facts were such that an application of Daubert was not neces-
sary, and Rule 403 was used independently to exclude the proffered evidence. See
Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668; Lech, 895 F. Supp. at 584-86.
195. See Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 1994) (relying on Rule 403
as "an independent basis" for excluding polygraph test results); see also Palmer v. City of
Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding a district court's prohibition of
polygraph testimony because its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value).
196. See McCall, supra note 1, at 422. McCall's study of the state of the polygraph in
the American legal system concludes by noting "that polygraph evidence will now be ad-
mitted in American trial courts on a greater scale than was conceivable before Daubert."
Id; see also Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 896 (allowing polygraph evidence at trial); Ulmer,
897 F. Supp. at 304 (admitting polygraph testimony); Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1364 (ad-
mitting polygraph testimony in limited circumstances).
197. See, e.g., Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668 (implying that if Rules 702 and 403 are satisfied
by the specific facts of the case, polygraph evidence may be admissible); United States v.
Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737, 740 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (hypothesizing as to potential in-
stances in which polygraph evidence is admissible); Lech, 895 F. Supp. at 584-86 (hinting
that if the hurdles of Rules 702 and 403 are cleared, polygraph results will be admitted).
If a profferer could decrease the prejudicial impact of the proposed polygraph testimony,
courts that chose to exclude the polygraph results solely for Rule 403 reasons appear to
be receptive to the notion of potential admissibility. See, e.g., Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668;
Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. at 740; Lech, 895 F. Supp. at 584-86.
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cludable.'98 Accordingly, Daubert appears to be incompatible with any
sort of per se rule of polygraph inadmissibility.99
If a specific inquiry is required in every instance, what factors allow for
the inclusion of the polygraph evidence?O In United States v. Gal-
breth,"' a federal district court judge found polygraph evidence admissi-
ble only after an exhaustive analysis of Daubert and its application to the
specific facts at issue." In determining that the polygraph was in fact
"scientific knowledge" under Daubert, the district court judge relied
heavily on the testimony given at the pre-trial hearing by eminent poly-
198. See, e.g., Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668; Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. at 740; Lech, 895 F.
Supp. at 584-86. These decisions did not undertake a Daubert analysis since the facts
pointed squarely to exclusion under Rule 403. See Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668; Dominguez,
902 F. Supp. at 740; Lech, 895 F. Supp. at 584-86. For example, in Kwong, a polygraph
expert sought to testify about three specific questions that he believed demonstrated the
defendant to be not guilty of attempted murder. 69 F.3d at 668. The Second Circuit held
all polygraph testimony to be properly excluded. See id. The court found that two of the
questions, even if answered honestly, in no way exculpated the defendant because of their
ambiguous phrasing. See id. The last question, which was worded "[d]o you know for
sure . . ." was not ambiguous, but nevertheless could be answered truthfully while still not
proving innocence in any way. Id. (alteration in original).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (forsak-
ing a per se rule of inadmissibility in the wake of Daubert); United States v. Posado, 57
F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 1995) (removing a per se rule of inadmissibility); Chatwin v. Davis
County, 936 F. Supp. 832, 838 (D. Utah 1996) (modifying the general rule of inadmissibil-
ity in the wake of Daubert); Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 878 (rejecting a per se rule of inad-
missibility).
Even those jurisdictions which excluded polygraph testimony based on Rule 403 never
acknowledged per se rules of inadmissibility, further strengthening the argument that
Daubert destroyed such a hard-line stance. See Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668 (refraining from an
analysis of Daubert as it applies to polygraph admissibility until a later date); Dominguez,
902 F. Supp. at 740 (recommending factors in addition to the Posado requirements that
should be followed in order to admit polygraph testimony); Lech, 895 F. Supp. at 584-86
(leaving open the question of future admissibility until proper factual circumstances dic-
tate a Daubert analysis).
200. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 893 ("[Wlhere a party seeks to introduce testimony
concerning the results of the [polygraph] test, the Court must embark upon a case specific
inquiry .... "); see also Posado, 57 F.3d at 436 (replacing the per se rule of polygraph in-
admissibility with a requirement of a specific inquiry by the trial judge).
201. 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995). In Galbreth, the defense sought to introduce the
testimony of preeminent polygraph expert Dr. David Raskin. Id. at 878. Based on his
interpretation of a polygraph test he administered to the defendant, William Galbreth,
Dr. Raskin intended to testify that Galbreth did not willfully evade his taxes as the Gov-
ernment claimed. See i& The court chose to undertake an analysis of the admissibility of
such testimony in light of Daubert. See id. at 879.
202. See id. at 878-95. The Court found that Galbreth sufficiently had proven the
proposed testimony to be scientific knowledge compatible with the five general observa-
tions of Daubert, and that Rule 403 was not violated. See id. at 890-95. Thus, the poly-
graph evidence was admissible. See id at 895.
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graph expert Dr. David Raskin."3 When the prosecution produced evi-
dence that ran contrary to admitting the polygraph results, the trial judge
refuted the testimony by quoting Dr. Raskin.4
In addition, the trial judge avoided conflicts with Daubert solely be-
cause Dr. Raskin was the individual who had conducted the polygraph
examination."' Many of the problems normally attributed to polygraph
examiners which could potentially serve to exclude the test results were
avoided due to Dr. Raskin's status in his field.2°6 For instance, while the
court noted that many errors occur when a polygraph examination is not
properly conducted, it held that since Dr. Raskin, an expert in polygra-
phy, administered this particular exam, such errors were not likely.2
Also, the court sidestepped the Daubert factor which called for proce-
dural standards governing the scientific technique in question by holding
that the regulations Dr. Raskin followed in this particular case were suf-
ficient." 8 While Dr. Raskin may well have followed the proper proce-
203. See id. at 891-95. The court obviously was influenced by the impressive creden-
tials and extensive experience of Dr. Raskin. See id. at 883. Indeed, Sections IV through
VIII of the Galbreth opinion were devoted almost entirely to the oral testimony of the
defense's polygraph expert, Dr. Raskin. See id. at 882-83.
204. See id. at 883-95. For example, the court chose to rely on Dr. Raskin regarding
the accuracy rates of the directed lie control polygraph technique, despite the fact that
only two studies supported its accuracy. See id. at 884-85. When confronted with con-
trary studies conducted by the Office of Technology and Assessment of the United States
Congress that recorded validity rates substantially lower than those of Dr. Raskin, the
court dismissed them solely because Raskin questioned their reliability. See id. at 887
n.12. The trial court used Dr. Raskin's testimony to rebut questions regarding polygraph
accuracy, the success of physical and drug-related countermeasures, the weak standards
of polygraph examiners, the impact of polygraph evidence on juries, and the notion that
certain personality types can defeat polygraph tests. See id. at 885-86, 888-90, 895.
205. See id. at 893. The Court completely avoided conflicts with the general observa-
tion made in Daubert regarding the standards that control the scientific technique at issue.
See id. at 891, 893. While admitting that nationwide standards governing polygraph ex-
aminers are weak, the court ignored this fact since the highly regarded Dr. Raskin con-
ducted the particular polygraph examination in question. See id. at 894. One commenta-
tor warns against such dependence on experts, stating "[o]verstatements by experts about
the conclusions that can be drawn from various scientific techniques are not uncommon."
Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1238.
206. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 882-90. Such problems include extremely poor ex-
aminer training, the lack of nationwide standards governing polygraph examiners, exam-
iners' tendency to manipulate or mislead subjects through coercion, and the minimal level
of scientific competence which exists throughout the industry. See infra Part IV.B.
207. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 894.
208. See id. at 892. The district court judge first noted that twenty states, including
New Mexico, have regulations to control the quality of polygraph exams and examiners.
See id. In Galbreth, Dr. Raskin complied with the New Mexico's strict Rule of Evidence
11-707. Id.; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing Rule 11-707).
Since Dr. Raskin personally followed these rigid guidelines, the judge found that Daubert
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dures, the court's ruling nonetheless was contrary to Daubert's call to
analyze the validity of the proposed scientific technique as a whole,
rather than the specific results of the case at issue.2"9 By selectively rely-
ing upon the validity of the polygraph technique and standards imple-
mented in this particular case alone and not for the polygraph industry as
a whole,21 the Galbreth court avoided problems associated with Dau-
bert's application."1 These difficulties potentially could have led to the
inadmissibility of the proposed polygraph testimony."'
Many post-Daubert decisions refuse to admit expert polygraph evi-
dence at trial for different reasons, such as the dangers of unfair preju-
dice as defined under Federal Rule 403.213 In United States v. Crumby,214
the district court judge who permitted the testimony's entry for a limited
purpose2" recognized this reasoning."' The judge, however, believed
was satisfied as far as the exam and examiner were concerned. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp.
at 892.
209. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). The Daubert
opinion specifically stated that when determining the admissibility of expert scientific evi-
dence, "[tihe focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the
conclusions that they generate." Id. Thus, the theory as a whole must pass the Daubert
test, not just the individualized case in question. See id. At one point in the opinion, the
Galbreth judge recognized this by paraphrasing Daubert's "emphasis on the process of
arriving at reliable conclusions rather than the conclusion itself." 908 F. Supp. at 881 (sec-
ond emphasis added). The judge, however, chose not to follow this reasoning later in the
opinion. See id. at 882. In referring to Daubert, the judge took the liberty to state that
"this Court [sic] does not believe that such language was intended to apply in the context
of the application of the polygraph technique." Id. at 882 n.7.
210. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 892, 894.
211. See supra note 204 (describing the Galbreth court's reliance upon the controver-
sial testimony of Dr. Raskin). Dr. Raskin's testimony regarding polygraph validity, the
likelihood of employing successful countermeasures, the impact of the testimony on the
jury, and the standards controlling polygraph examiners are all subject to challenge. See
infra notes 227-59, 292-302, and accompanying text (challenging Dr. Raskin's assertions).
212. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (describing the general observations that the
lower courts could use to assess the admissibility of proffered scientific expert testimony).
213. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions which have
prohibited polygraph testimony based on Rule 403).
214. 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995).
215. See id. at 1365. The judge allowed for the admission of the polygraph testimony,
provided the profferer satisfied some strict requirements. See id. First, the evidence
would be admissible only when used to impeach or corroborate the defendant's testi-
mony. See id. Second, the defendant had to provide adequate notice to the opposing
party, allowing them sufficient time to conduct their own separate polygraph examination.
See id. Character witnesses could relate that the defendant had in fact passed a polygraph
exam. See id. Such narrowly tailored rules were established pursuant to Rule 403's man-
date that the prejudicial effect of the testimony not substantially outweigh its probative
impact. See id. at 1364.
216. See id. at 1361. The court stated that "the potential prejudicial effects of permit-
ting a jury to consider a polygraphy examination are enormous, and thus rather disturb-
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that this prejudice could be minimized by restricting the expert's testi-
mony to the validity of the polygraph technique itself and to the specific
results of the individual test given."' The court prohibited any testimony
pertaining to the actual questions asked or responses given throughout
the course of the examination."8 Thus, in this way the Crumby court be-
lieved it had successfully skirted a Rule 403 conflict.219 While such rea-
soning is dubious, this limited-purpose usage of the polygraph evidence
nevertheless allowed for its admissibility."
IV. APPLYING DAUBERTTO THE QUESTION OF POLYGRAPH
ADMISSIBILITY: WHY THE POLYGRAPH FAILS THE TEST
To gain admission as expert scientific evidence, Daubert stated that the
judge must find the proffered testimony to be "scientific knowledge" un-
der Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.' The Court provided
five general observations that trial judges were to consider in assessing
the admissibility of expert testimony.2 While these five observations are
not talismanic, lower courts nevertheless have applied them as essential
ingredients to polygraph admittance.l In addition, even if Rule 702 is
ing." Id. For discussions regarding the prejudicial impact of polygraph testimony, see
infra Part IV.D.
217. See Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1363. The polygraph expert was restricted to testi-
fying as to the validity of the polygraph technique, and could not answer any queries re-
garding the specific questions or results of the examination. See id. Character witnesses
were responsible for testifying that the defendant had in fact passed a polygraph examina-
tion. See id. In addition to the prejudices covered under Rule 403, the judge in Crumby
was also concerned about the prejudices that could result if he allowed the polygraph ex-
pert to give an opinion regarding the ultimate issue of the case, namely the defendant's
guilt or innocence. Id. at 1362-63. For a discussion of polygraph testimony as it relates to
the ultimate issue of a case, see infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text explaining that
polygraph evidence goes directly to the defendant's guilt or innocence, and, if believed by
the jury, decides the case.
218. See Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1363. The Crumby court believed that by admitting
the actual questions of the polygraph exam, the prejudicial value of the testimony would
substantially outweigh its probative value. Id.; cf. United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255,
1262 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding the prejudicial impact of admitting testimony concerning the
specific questions asked and answers given during the test would substantially outweigh
its probative worth).
219. See Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1361. The judge in Crumby believed that by de-
manding that the evidence be "narrowly tailored and admitted only for a limited pur-
pose," the potential prejudicial effect of the polygraph testimony would not outweigh the
probative value of the proffered evidence. Id.
220. See id. at 1364-65.
221. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
222. See id. at 592-95; see supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text (describing the
five observations in more detail).
223. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95.
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satisfied, the proffered testimony must fulfill the requirements of Rule
403 to be admissible at trial.22' Rule 403 is a balancing test which weighs
the probative value of the proffered testimony against the prejudicial
impact such evidence would have on the jury.2 Galbreth and Crumby
are examples of courts' misapplication of Daubert to the question of
polygraph admissibility. Since an objective application of Daubert to this
question reveals difficulties with both Daubert's general observations
and Rule 403, such testimony should be excluded from trial absent sig-
226nificant changes and improvements.
A. Validity and Rates of Error: Beyond the Propaganda
As Daubert states, one factor trial courts should consider is the rate of
error associated with the scientific technique in question.27  For the
polygraph, the most accurate rate of error is calculated by analyzing the
validity, and not the reliability, of the test results.m In those cases in
which Daubert was applied to the question of polygraph admissibility
and the evidence was admitted, the courts found approximately a 90% to
95% validity rate for a typical polygraph examination.29 For the follow-
ing reasons, such findings are difficult to conceive.
224. See id.; see also supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing Daubert's re-
minder that otherwise admissible evidence is excludable if found to conflict with Rule
403).
225. See FED. R. EVID. 403. As previously noted, countless courts have excluded
polygraph evidence because the prejudicial impact of admitting the results substantially
outweighed their probative worth. See supra notes 193-195 (listing numerous courts
making such a determination).
226. See infra Part IV.D (arguing that Rule 403 should prohibit polygraph testimony
from trial).
227. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. The Court stated that the "known or potential rate
of error" should factor in the assessment of whether or not the proffered testimony is sci-
entific knowledge. Id.
228. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 264-65. Reliability merely tells a party "the consis-
tency with which the test produces the same result in the same circumstances." Id. at 264.
Validity, however, relates "the probability that the test result is accurate or true." Id.; see
also MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 206, at 374 (recognizing Lykken's position that the "ac-
curacy" figures quoted by polygraph proponents may not be true measures of validity).
229. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 885-86 (D.N.M. 1995). The trial
judge found the figures Dr. Raskin quoted to be more persuasive than other studies,
which the court brashly labeled "methodologically weaker" than those of Dr. Raskin. Id.
at 885-86. The judge thus relied upon polygraph studies that found a 95% accuracy rate
for discerning guilty subjects and a 90% rate for spotting innocent subjects. See id.; see
also United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995). The Crumby
court, again relying upon expert witness Dr. Raskin, found an accuracy rate of approxi-
mately 90%. Id.
230. See infra notes 231-44 and accompanying text (discussing the validity rate of the
polygraph).
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First, these conclusions simply disregard volumes of scientifically
credible studies finding validity rates much lower than those the courts
employ.231 The congressionally-supported Office of Technological As-
sessment concluded that the polygraph was capable of producing "sig-
nificant error rates. ' '2 2 Polygraph expert Professor David Lykken ana-
lyzed scientifically plausible studies and arrived at a validity rate of
roughly 70%.233
Polygraph professionals' studies revealed higher validity rates,3 but
questions abound as to the examiners' procedures 35 and personal moti-
231. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 24, at 97 (finding a low accuracy rate of 64%
in one study and a low of 12.5% in another); Douglas Carroll, How Accurate Is Polygraph
Lie Detection?, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES, TRUTH AND SCIENCE 19, 22-27 (An-
thony Gale ed., 1988) (finding accuracy rates that varied from an average of approxi-
mately 80% to approximately 60%); Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 23, at 96 (con-
ducting a study that revealed a 37% misclassification rate of innocent testees as guilty);
Lykken, supra note 24, at 265 (quoting an overall validity of approximately 70% or 20%
better than chance). The OTA Report also cited a scientifically valid study that misla-
beled up to 75 out of every 100 innocent subjects as guilty. See OTA REPORT, supra note
24, at 97.
232. OTA REPORT, supra note 24, at 96. The OTA Report went on to add that "ex-
aminer and examinee differences and the use of countermeasures may further [nega-
tively] affect validity." Id. Dr. Raskin challenged the accuracy of this report, stating that
the examiners who participated in the studies were "not adequately trained" and inferior
to those used in his studies. Raskin, supra note 24, at 45. Given that Dr. Raskin admits
that "a substantial proportion of those who conduct tests in the public and private sectors
lack adequate training and competence," are not the OTA tests the more accurate indica-
tors of polygraph validity? Id. at 66-67. See also infra Part IV.D (discussing the weak
overall state of examiner training and competency). One commentator also cites numer-
ous studies pointing to false positive errors of approximately 50%. See Kleinmuntz &
Szucko, supra note 23, at 96. Thus, almost one of every two innocent persons in their
studies was misclassified as guilty. See id.
233. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 265. Since random luck would produce an accuracy
rate of 50%, this figure is only marginally better than chance for determining the veracity
or dishonesty of a subject. See id.
234. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 997-98 (summarizing numerous studies and
arriving at a validity estimate in excess of 90%); Raskin, supra note 24, at 42 (quoting an
accuracy rate of 95%).
235. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 993-94. Many of the studies conducted and
relied upon by the polygraph advocates have taken place in a laboratory environment, or
surroundings the scientists controlled. See id. at 993. Such research is often "criticized for
a lack of realism" that may limit the applicability of the results outside the laboratory en-
vironment. Id. at 994.
Besides laboratory research, polygraph experts also participate in field studies. See id.
at 993-94. While more realistic than the lab experiments, many of these studies are unre-
liable because of difficulties in determining when the real-life subject is "telling the
truth ... independent of the outcome of the test." Id. at 994; see also Raskin, supra note
24, at 43 (stating that determining polygraph accuracy is "made difficult by the need to
establish a valid criterion of guilt or innocence"). In order to establish independent of the
test results, whether the subject is telling the truth, Raskin recommends the use of subse-
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vations.2 Only a handful of such studies have been found to be credible
scientifically, and of those that are, the validity rates show polygraph re-
sults to be wrong nearly one-third of the time.27 In addition, almost all
of the studies attempting to determine the validity of the polygraph
failed to take into account the effectiveness of physical countermeasures
in skewing test results. 38 Subjects employing countermeasures such as
quent confessions by polygraph subjects. See id. at 44. This, however, has been criticized
as producing a "sampling bias" that seriously undermines the reliability of using confes-
sions. Charles R. Honts & Mary V. Perry, Polygraph Admissibility: Changes and Chal-
lenges, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 357, 361 (1992). This sampling bias refers to the fact
that law enforcement officials usually obtain confessions only from those that fail poly-
graph examinations. See Christopher J. Patrick & William G. Iacono, Validity of the
Control Question Polygraph Test: The Problem of Sampling Bias, 76 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 229, 229 (1991). The failed test "provides the incentive for an examiner to in-
terrogate a subject, and if the subject confesses, the polygraph outcome is confirmed." Id.
A sampling bias thus results. See id. Despite this bias in favor of proving polygraph va-
lidity, the results of the Carroll survey on the accuracy rates of field studies were "gener-
ally low, and the rate of false positive judgments staggeringly high." Carroll, supra note
231, at 27.
236. See Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 23, at 93, 95. Most polygraph studies are
conducted by actual polygraph examiners and professionals. See id. at 93. Authors
Kleinmuntz and Szucko believe that this fact indicates a "strongly vested interest in dem-
onstrating the reliability and validity of lie detection." Id. at 95. While not going so far as
to label polygraph professionals as intentionally fraudulent, the authors nevertheless im-
ply that their research results may be clouded in some way by their subjective prejudices.
See id.; see also David T. Lykken, Reply to Raskin and Kirchner, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 278,
281 (1987) (citing various associations and governments currently concerned about the
invalidity of polygraph testing). Lykken, in a thinly veiled attack on Dr. Raskin and the
polygraph profession, stated, "I have yet to encounter a scientist familiar with these issues
but not personally involved in the polygraph business who endorses Raskin's position in
this debate." Id.
237. See David T. Lykken, The Case Against Polygraph Testing, in THE POLYGRAPH
TEST: LIES, TRUTH AND SCIENCE 111, 117 (Anthony Gale ed., 1988) (analyzing three
scientifically credible field studies). In addition, Lykken points out that polygraph exams
are "seriously biased against the truthful subject" because of their high rates of false posi-
tive errors. Id. at 124; see also Carroll, supra note 231, at 22 (researching lab studies in
arriving at an accuracy rate of approximately 75%, with a 23% chance of an innocent per-
son being misclassified as guilty).
238. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(C), at 230; see also supra
note 42 and accompanying text (defining physical countermeasures). According to Dr.
Raskin, the key to beating the polygraph through physical countermeasures is "to create
reactions to the control questions stronger than the reactions that occurred when [the in-
dividual] lied to the relevant questions." Raskin, supra note 24, at 51. Spontaneous coun-
termeasures have proven to be unsuccessful in defeating the polygraph machine. See id.
Individuals given minimal training in physical countermeasures, however, have been re-
markably successful in producing false negative results. See id.; see also GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(C) at 230; see also Lykken, supra note 24, at 267
(discussing the prevalent nature of easily learned countermeasures).
In addition to countermeasures, the OTA Report warned that factors such as the gen-
der, intelligence, or race of the subject may negatively impact the validity of polygraph
tests as well. See OTA REPORT, supra note 24, at 85-86. Further, at least one commenta-
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gently biting their tongues or pressing their toes to the floor during ques-
tioning have been extremely successful in producing false negative re-
SUitS.
239
Polygraph proponents, while recognizing that physical countermea-
sures greatly may increase the number of false-negative errors, hold that
such techniques require specialized and intense training of the subject2m
Yet, at least one study has shown that a group of subjects given a mere
fifteen minutes of instruction on the proper physical countermeasure
techniques were successful in producing false-negative results in nearly
89% of the cases.4 Using the same simple countermeasures, almost
one-half of students participating in a mock-crime study were able to de-
feat the polygraph.2 The utilization of easily taught and learned physi-
tor believes that the subject being tested can control the autonomic responses that the
polygraph measures. See Tara Ney, Expressing Your Emotions and Controlling Your
Feelings, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES, TRUTH AND SCIENCE 65, 67 (Anthony Gale
ed., 1988). Thus, "an individual, only vaguely familiar with the procedures of lie-
detection testing, may produce physiological responses on opportune occasions and
thereby portray himself as an innocent victim." Id.
239. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(C), at 230; see also Lyk-
ken, supra note 24, at 267 (describing the success of easily taught countermeasures in
producing incorrect polygraph results),
240. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 51 (suggesting that beating the polygraph via coun-
termeasures necessitates specialized training). The court in United States v. Galbreth ba-
sically dismissed the feasibility of countermeasures based on Dr. Raskin's testimony that
only "specialized hands-on training" in such techniques could cause high false negative
result errors. 908 F. Supp. 877, 890 (D.N.M. 1995). In that same trial, Dr. Raskin admit-
ted that if guilty subjects did in fact receive such training, up to 50% could effectively
produce false-negative results. See id. In addition, he testified that the examiner would
likely not be capable of detecting such countermeasures. See id.
241. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 267. The test was conducted on prison inmates
who had been accused of violating certain prison regulations. See id. After receiving only
brief instructions on the types of physical countermeasures, 24 of 27 (89%) were able to
manipulate the polygraph into producing erroneous results. See id. Dr. Raskin questions
the results of the Lykken experiment, stating "there is no scientifically acceptable way to
verify the information provided by those convicted felons, a population of individuals no-
toriously lacking in candor." Raskin, supra note 24, at 52. This is an interesting challenge
by Raskin, for he relies on the candor of such convicted felons in using their confessions
as the criterion for establishing their guilt or innocence independent of the polygraph re-
sults. See id. at 44; see also supra note 235.
242. See Charles R. Honts et al., Effects of Spontaneous Countermeasures on the
Physiological Detection of Deception, 16 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 91, 91-92 (1988). An-
other study found that 78% of those tested were able to defeat the polygraph exam. See
id. While in these studies the subjects were given more thorough lessons in effectively
utilizing the countermeasures, the techniques used were nonetheless identical to those
Lykken taught in his study. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 267. Research has shown that
spontaneous countermeasures by the subject are unsuccessful in producing high rates of
polygraph errors. See Honts, supra, at 93. However, given that the proper techniques for
defeating the polygraph are now within "the public domain" and easily accessible, spon-
taneous countermeasures are not the type that would most likely be employed during an
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cal countermeasures seriously undermines the accuracy of polygraph test
results.243 Since such effective countermeasures are accessible to almost
anyone taking a polygraph examination, the courts applying Daubert
should be wary of the idealized validity rates proposed by those in favor
of polygraph admissibility.4
B. Examiner Standards
In addition to analyzing rates of error, Daubert encourages trial courts
to factor in the existing standards that regulate the scientific procedure
being considered. 45 A Daubert inquiry does not merely require courts to
determine whether some standards exist, but rather whether such stan-
dards are indicators of the technique as valid scientific knowledge4U Be-
cause current polygraph regulations allow for a large percentage of
poorly trained and incompetent examiners, the standards on the whole
fail a faithful application of Daubert 47
exam. Lykken, supra note 24, at 267.
243. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 267. Two studies revealed that the use of physical
countermeasures "allowed subjects to 'beat' the polygraph." See OTA REPORT, supra
note 24, at 88. In addition, a test conducted by Dr. Raskin and others found a false nega-
tive rate of 78% when subjects utilized countermeasures. See id.
244. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 267 ("Any prudent defendant ... will find the
[countermeasure] method[s] explained in at least one book available in most public li-
braries.").
245. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
246. See id. at 593. Daubert delineates five general observations in order to assist the
trial judge in determining whether the proffered testimony is "scientifically valid
and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in is-
sue." Id. Merely ascertaining that some standards exist to regulate a certain technique,
regardless of their effectiveness at controlling the procedures, does not assist the trial
judge in making a determination regarding scientific knowledge. Therefore, Daubert im-
plies that the standards be of sufficient quality to aid the judge in determining whether
the proffered testimony is scientific knowledge. See id.
247. See, e.g., GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 218 (stating
that polygraph "proponents acknowledge that there are serious problems" with examin-
ers); Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 998-99 (commenting on the "poor general state" of
polygraph examiners nationwide); Raskin, supra note 24, at 66-67 (admitting the poor
state of polygraph examiners). Honts and Quick clearly subscribe to the belief that the
current training standards produce many inferior examiners. Honts & Quick, supra note
3, at 998-99. Since they believe that polygraph testimony should be admissible, Honts and
Quick would avoid this problem of poor training by having the judge question "in de-
tail ... [the examiner's] basic knowledge of psychology, psychophysiological measure-
ment, validation problems, and the scientific literature that has directly addressed poly-
graph testing." Id. at 998. Arguably, this would ensure that the particular examiner in
the case was sufficiently skilled and trained. See id. 998-99. This alternative, however,
would not only be time-consuming, but would also force the trial judge to analyze scien-
tific data far beyond his capacity as a layman, and, in effect, to become the "amateur sci-
entist" that Chief Justice Rehnquist warned of in his Daubert dissent. See Daubert, 509
U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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As mentioned previously, the role of the examiner is the most critical
variable in the entire polygraph process. Yet even the most ardent
supporters of the polygraph concede that a great majority of American
polygraph examiners are inadequately trained and educated.249  Some
may resort to psychological mind games in order to induce the desired
test results. 250 As of 1996, at least twenty states had no regulations or
standards controlling who can become a licensed polygraph examiner,'
248. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text (explaining the critical role of the
examiner in the polygraph process); see also GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note
24, § 8-2(A), at 218 (proclaiming that "the examiner, and not the machine, is the crucial
factor in arriving at reliable results").
249. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 66-67. Raskin openly admits that "a substantial
proportion of those who conduct tests in the public and private sectors lack adequate
training and competence." Id. In addition, the examiner inadequacies found in the pri-
vate sector and in local law enforcement agencies far exceed those of the federal examin-
ers. See id. at 68. Experts Honts and Perry attacked the unacceptable state of training
polygraph examiners in their 1992 study. See Honts & Perry, supra note 235, at 375
("Polygraph examiners in the United States, as a whole, are poorly trained."). Honts co-
authored an article on the polygraph and reaffirmed that standards controlling the poly-
graph industry were sorely in need of revamping. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 998
(citing a "poor general state of examiner training in the polygraph profession"). The
authors encouraged courts to interrogate polygraph examiners thoroughly regarding their
knowledge of psychology and other scientific practices prior to allowing them to testify as
experts at trial. See id. at 998-99.
250. See Underwood, supra note 2, at 632. Underwood asserts that polygraph exam-
iners may play "[sluggestive and coercive games" when conducting tests. Id. One com-
mentator described examiners as often "misleading the subject as to the efficacy of the
test" and creating "anxiety to induce compliance." Anthony Gale, Introduction: The
Polygraph Test, More Than Scientific Investigation, in THE POLYGRAPH TEST: LIES,
TRUTH AND SCIENCE 2 (Anthony Gale ed., 1988). Underwood added that oftentimes the
results of a test hinge on "subjective factors" the examiner generates by studying the tes-
tee's conduct. Underwood, supra note 2, at 632; see also Carroll, supra note 231, at 27
("[D]ata strongly suggest that the subject's general demeanour offers more accurate
grounds for attributing innocence than the polygraph chart .... ).
251. See McCall, supra note 1, at 415. Currently, at least 25 states have guidelines
governing who can conduct polygraph examinations. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 34-25-21,
34-25-22 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 17-39-201, 17-39-202 (Michie 1995); 225 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 430/10.1, 430/11 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 25-30-2-2, 25-30-2-3 (Mi-
chie 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 80A.3 (West 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.010 (Mi-
chie 1995); LA, REV. STAT. ANN. § 2838 (West 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
7155 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 147, § 22 (West 1991); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 338.1710 (West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1915, 81-1916 (1994); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 648.0109 (Michie 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-27(A) (Michie 1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74C-8(d) (1989); N.D, CENT. CODE § 43-31-07 (1993); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 1457 (West Supp. 1997); id. § 1458 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 703.090
(1995); 14 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 40-53-70 (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-30-
3 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-27-107 (1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4413 (29cc), § 8 (West 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-64-302 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 2904 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-1801 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5c
(1996).
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and of those that do, very few actually ensure that the examiner is in fact
adequately trained.f2
Since 1983, proponents of polygraph admissibility have pointed to
New Mexico's Rule 707 as a model for other jurisdictions to follow.23
The regulation has not been replicated in other states, however, and it
seems that it will remain merely a local rule.24 Outside of New Mexico,
standards existing in almost all states do not ensure the production of
sufficiently skilled and trained examiners.25
Since there is no uniformity among the states, no standardized rules
exist to control the actual examination procedure and performance of
the exam itself.26 This produces inaccurate and erroneous test results.f7
In addition, three states had regulations governing the licensing requirements of poly-
graph examiners, but have recently repealed these and all other polygraph examiner
regulations. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32.2701-.2715 (West Supp. 1995), repealed by
1991 Ariz. Sess. Law. Ch. 8, § 10, reprinted in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2992.04 (West
Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-36-1 to 43-36-22 (1994), repealed by 1994 Ga. Laws
744, § 1; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-62-101 to 37-62-311 (1995), repealed by 1995 Mont.
Laws § 128, ch. 429.
252. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 68-69 (noting that despite the license requirements
in some states, many still produce examiners of "minimal competence"); see also McCall,
supra note 1, at 415 n.365. McCall asserts that the "typical" licensing statute demands
"that an examiner be of good moral character, have a bachelor's degree and a six-month
study course in polygraphy, and pass an examination." Id. Thus, in six months, the indi-
vidual apparently is capable of learning the voluminous scientific, physiological, psycho-
logical, and ethical elements that are a part of the study of the polygraph. See id.
253. See McCall, supra note 1, at 415 (calling for an adoption of the New Mexico rule
in order to increase the reliability of polygraph examinations); Raskin, supra note 23, at
72 (encouraging states to model their licensing statutes after Rule 707 of New Mexico);
see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 707).
254. See generally Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1000. Rule 707 requires that all
parts of the polygraph examination be either audio or videotaped in order to deter subject
manipulation and examiner abuses. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-707(E) (Michie 1996).
Honts and Quick see this as a "minimum requirement" that states should impose on those
conducting polygraph examinations. Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1000. No state has
followed New Mexico's lead on this issue. See id.
255. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 998 (questioning the standards controlling
examiner training); Raskin, supra note 23, at 66-68 (detailing the insufficient training of
polygraph examiners nationwide). Another problem with polygraph examiners is that
years of experience do not necessarily mean that they have improved their techniques or
skills. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 269. Unlike other scientists, who could learn with
certainty from their mistakes, the polygraph examiner very rarely has the chance to see
whether his diagnosis was correct. See id. Thus, years of practice may teach one nothing
new about his or her skills as a polygraph examiner. See id.
256. See McCall, supra note 1, at 415 (stating that standards to ensure accurate test
results exist solely for examiner training and experience, and not for control of the actual
examinations themselves).
257. See Raskin, supra note 24, at 66-67. Polygraph supporters have great confidence
in the polygraph's abilities when "employed by well-trained and competent examiners."
Id. at 66. Most examiners, however, lack the "minimal competence" to administer such
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Attempts at improvements by polygraph administrator associations have
not rectified the problem, nor are they expected to in the future.28 As a
result, the existing polygraph standards completely fail a true application
of Daubert.59
C. General Acceptance
The Daubert decision did not completely abandon the general accep-
tance test of Frye.2'° Rather, the general acceptance test remains a factor
that the lower courts are to consider when assessing the admissibility of
expert testimony.261 In applying Daubert to the question of expert poly-
graph evidence, it becomes apparent that no such general acceptance
exists in the relevant scientific community.262
The science of polygraphy is based upon a complex combination ofS 261
psychological, neurological, and physiological assumptions. In ascer-
tests adequately. Id. at 66-69. Given the significance of the examiner in the entire poly-
graph process, the likely result of such poor training is invalid and unreliable test scores.
See generally GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(A), at 218 (explaining
that "the examiner, and not the machine, is the crucial factor in arriving at reliable re-
sults").
258. See Honts & Perry, supra note 235, at 370 (describing how internal forces in the
polygraph industry prevented and will continue to prevent change in this field). In addi-
tion, one commentator states that "polygraph lie detection does not and, in the foresee-
able future, probably cannot work well enough to justify its continued use in the field."
Lykken, supra note 237, at 125.
259. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (observing
that appropriate standards must exist to control the technique in question). It is interest-
ing to note how the courts applying Daubert to polygraph admissibility have handled the
conflict between the Daubert factor regarding appropriate scientific standards and those
standards unique to the polygraph profession. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 892
(D.N.M. 1995). In Galbreth, the profferer of polygraph testimony complied with New
Mexico's Rule 707. Id. The Galbreth court reasoned that because the standards used by
the individual polygrapher were acceptable and likely to produce accurate results, the
evidence was admissible. Id. This rationale runs contrary to Daubert, which requires a
trial court to focus on the overall "principles and methodology, not on the conclusions
that they generate." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Another court faced with the proffer of
polygraph evidence avoided conflicts with this Daubert factor by not mentioning poly-
graph standards in the opinion. See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz.
1995).
260. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. The Court was reluctant to forsake the general ac-
ceptance test due to the important insight it offered with respect to how the scientific
community viewed the proffered testimony. See id. Evidence that was well received in
the community would tip the scales towards admissibility, while a technique or theory
with little backing would "properly be viewed with skepticism." Id.
261. See id. (holding that the general acceptance test may "yet have a bearing on the
inquiry").
262. See infra Part IV.C (commenting on the lack of general scientific acceptance of
polygraph testing in the relevant scientific communities).
263. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1975). In Alexander,
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taining general acceptance, the relevant scientific community should in-
clude, therefore, not only polygraphers but also psychologists, physiolo-
gists, psychophysiologists, and neurologists.2"
Do these expert communities support the theories behind polygraphy?
Polygraphers obviously endorse the instrument.265 More objectively,
however, the American Medical Association strongly questioned the va-
lidity of polygraph results in choosing not to endorse the instrument's
use."" Its one-time spokesman, Dr. John F. Beary, III, has sharply criti-cized the theories upon which the polygraph rests.267 The American and
a party offered polygraph evidence to prove that he did not possess an illegal firearm
when confronted by the police. Id. at 162. In finding that the proffered testimony failed
the Frye test, the court noted the different fields of science that contribute to the general
polygraph theory. See id. at 164. Because polygraphers "often lack extensive training in
these specialized sciences[,]" experts from other fields were needed to prove general ac-
ceptance in the scientific community. Id. at 164 n.6; see also United States v. Helton, 10
M.J. 820, 824 n.14 (A.F.C.M.A. 1981) (stating that experts from both the medical and be-
havioral sciences fields were necessary in order to ensure the validity of polygraphy). In
Helton, the court found that such support was lacking. Id.
264. See Alexander, 526 F.2d at 164 & n.6. In ascertaining the relevant scientific
community to be used in answering the question of general acceptance, the court stated
that the technique must "have attained sufficient scientific acceptance among experts in
polygraphy, psychiatry, physiology, psychophysiology, neurophysiology and other related
disciplines." Id. at 164. The complicated nature of the polygraph itself required experts
from fields outside of polygraphy to "offer needed enlightenment" upon its theories. Id.
at 164 n.6.
265. See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding
that polygraphers accept the theories and techniques of the polygraph machine). Inter-
estingly, one individual who served as a pioneer in the field of polygraphy, John Larson,
eventually concluded that the science was in fact a failure at detecting deception. See
Underwood, supra note 2, at 629 (quoting Larson as referring to the science as a
"'racket"' and a "'psychological third degree"') (citations omitted).
266. See Council Report: Polygraph, 256 JAMA 1172, 1175 (1986). The American
Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs analyzed the validity of the polygraph
in 1986. See id. at 1172. Upon the conclusion of its study, the Council found there existed
"enough false-positives and false-negatives to make many applications [of the polygraph],
perhaps even in criminal cases, of dubious value." Id. at 1173.
267. See George C. Wilson, I Know the Polygraph Lied, WASH. POST, July 18, 1985, at
A23. Dr. Beary noted the limitations of the polygraph: "'[N]o machine can detect a lie.
The machine can only detect stress; however, the stress may result from several emotional
causes other than guilt, such as fear, surprise or anger .... The polygraph misclassifies
innocent people as liars."' Id. (quoting Dr. John F. Beary, III) (omission in original).
Like Dr. Beary, others have strongly questioned the theory behind the polygraph:
[T]here is no reason to believe that lying produces distinctive physiological
changes that characterize it and only it .... No doubt when we tell a lie many of
us experience an inner turmoil, but we experience a similar turmoil when we are
falsely accused of a crime, when we are anxious about having to defend our-
selves against accusations, when we are questioned about sensitive topics-and,
for that matter, when we are elated or otherwise emotionally stirred.
Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 23, at 87; see also LYKKEN, supra note 2, at 61 (noting
that "no pattern of physiological response is unique to lying") (emphasis omitted).
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British Psychological Associations have voiced doubts as to the poly-
graph's accuracy and validity as well.268 Some behavioral scientists have
attacked the underlying theories of polygraphy, concluding that humans
can control the allegedly involuntary physiological changes that the
polygraph measures.26 9
To counter such imposing resistance, advocates of polygraph admissi-
bility often cite two surveys as proof of general acceptance in the field of
psychophysiology.7 ° These surveys found that, on average, 61% of a
particular psychophysiological research group viewed the polygraph ei-
ther to be helpful when taken with other evidence or reliable enough to
judge credibility on its own."' To polygraph proponents, this endorse-
ment is sufficient to overcome the other denouncements and to prove
272general scientific acceptance .
268. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 281 (describing the lack of general scientific accep-
tance for polygraphy by those not directly affiliated with the science). In addition, a sur-
vey cited in a recent federal district court case found that nearly 65% of psychophysiolo-
gists believed that the control question technique, the most popular method of polygraph
testing in America, was not scientifically sound. See Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581,
588 (D. Conn. 1996). In addition, approximately 75% of psychophysiologists disagreed
with the proposition "that the CQT was at least 85% accurate." Id.
269. See United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820,823 & n.12 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981).
270. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016. The Gallup Organization was respon-
sible in 1982 for the first of these two surveys. See id. Susan Amato conducted the second
as part of a master's thesis at the University of North Dakota. See id. The Galbreth court
relied in large part upon these two surveys in finding that general scientific acceptance for
polygraphy existed. United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 892-93 (D.N.M. 1995).
The court considered psychophysiologists involved in these surveys so "well-informed" on
polygraph theory that they were the only relevant scientific community it considered
when gauging general acceptance. Id. The court also boldly proclaimed that the poly-
graph had gained "acceptance amongst a majority of the community" and "enjoys sub-
stantial approval," all the while never defining the scientific community or citing the
sources of its proclamations. Id. at 893.
271. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016. The Gallup survey of 1982 resulted in
62% agreement, while the Amato poll found only 60%. See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 892.
272. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016 (concluding based on the two surveys
alone "that there is a great deal of acceptance of these techniques in the relevant scien-
tific community"). The Crumby court also relied heavily on the two psychophysiological
surveys. Crumby v. United States, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995). It, however,
utilized the results in a different manner. The court implied that the percentage of psy-
chophysiologists surveyed that found the polygraph of questionable usefulness did not
demonstrate general acceptance in the community. See id. To overcome this, the trial
judge first disqualified the opinions of many of the psychophysiologists because they
"were not necessarily polygraphers, and thus their status in the relevant scientific com-
munity [was] questionable." Id. Furthermore, the judge decided to "not place much em-
phasis on Daubert's inclusion of the Frye 'general acceptance' test in the new Rule 702
analysis." Id. The result was admissibility. See id. at 1363.
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Such reliance is misplaced for three reasons."' First, a similar survey
of psychophysiologists found that only 36% believed the CQT, the most
popular form of polygraph testing in the United States,2 4 to be scientifi-
cally sound.275 Second, by relying solely on these studies to determine
general acceptance, relevant scientific disciplines, whose experts are
more than qualified to offer opinions on the complex polygraph, are
completely ignored.276 Third, the survey itself is misleading. 277 The ques-
tion assumes that the individuals who conduct the examination have re-
ceived adequate polygraph training.278 This of course is not the reality.279
In addition, two of the four potential answers in this multiple choice
question were combined to arrive at the final acceptance percentage tal-
273. See generally supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text (noting the lack of ac-
ceptance by those not directly affiliated with polygraphy).
274. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
275. See Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581, 588-90 (D. Conn. 1996) (using the survey
results in declining to admit polygraph evidence).
276. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text (discussing the different fields of
science that contribute to polygraph testing). Since polygraphy involves a "tech-
nique ... premised upon a complicated interrelationship of psychological stress," one
must analyze sciences such as neurology and psychiatry in order to understand the com-
plex nature of the polygraph theory. United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 164 & 164
n.6 (8th Cir. 1975).
277. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016 & n.229. The survey results were based
solely upon one multiple choice question posed to the psychophysiologists: "Which one of
these four statements best describes your own opinion of polygraph test interpretations
by those who have received systematic training in the technique, when they are called
upon to interpret whether a subject is or is not telling the truth?" Id. at 1016 n.229. The
scientists were asked to choose from four answers: "A) It is a sufficiently reliable method
to be the sole determinant, B) It is a useful diagnostic tool when considered with other
available information, C) It is of questionable usefulness, entitled to little weight against
other available information, D) It is of no usefulness." Id. If one answered either A or B,
then these two answers were combined to form the nearly two-thirds of experts who were
found to accept the polygraph technique. See id. at 1016.
278. See id. at 1016 n.229. The question is phrased so as to assume that the polygraph
examiners have received "systematic training in the technique," a statement that obvi-
ously implies a properly educated examiner. Id.
279. See supra notes 245-59 and accompanying text (explaining the poor state of poly-
graph examiners nationwide). To reiterate, the examiner is the most vital component of
the entire examination process. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-
2(A), at 218. Even the most ardent supporters of the polygraph technique concede that
the most pressing problem facing polygraphy today is the shortage of well-trained exam-
iners. See id.; see also Raskin, supra note 24, at 66-67 (discussing the problem of poorly
trained examiners). Since the survey question assumes this most vital of variables, its re-
liability is immediately brought into question.
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lies.o Moreover, one of the four choices was not a realistic option.2 As
such, the survey reveals that approximately 60% of psychophysiologists
chose two potential choices, which were combined to show approval of
the polygraph, over one choice that signaled disapproval2m  In all, such
inflated and deceptive figures do not equate to general acceptance.
D. Conflicts with Rule 403
Daubert encouraged trial judges to be mindful of relevant and other-
wise admissible evidence that was nevertheless excludable due to con-
flicts with Rule 403." Prior to Daubert, many jurisdictions ruling on the
admissibility of polygraph testimony chose to prohibit such evidence
based on the prejudice standard embodied in Rule 403.8 Even assum-
ing arguendo that the polygraph evidence somehow passed the Daubert
criteria of Rule 702, such testimony should be excluded because of its in-
herent prejudicial effects on the jury and the trial system as a whole. 5
280. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016 n.229; see also note 270 and accompa-
nying text (describing the composition of the surveys). According to the average of the
two surveys, 39% of those polled chose neither "A" nor "B." See Galbreth, 908 F. Supp.
at 892 (listing the exact results of the two surveys); Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016
(describing the survey choices). Rather than refer to these opponents of the polygraph as
"nearly forty percent," the Crumby court chose to label them as "approximately a third of
the respondents." United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (D. Ariz. 1995). By
conveniently rounding down the totals of those opposing the polygraph, the judge was
able to assert that the instrument was "generally accepted" in the scientific community.
Id.
281. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016 n.229; Lykken, supra note 24, at 265.
Lykken is perhaps the most vocal of all polygraph skeptics. See GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 24, § 8-2(C), at 227. Even Lykken grants polygraphs the dis-
tinction of being "a useful improvement over random guessing." Lykken, supra note 24,
at 265. Thus, if those openly opposed to the technique give it at least some measure of
value, it is unrealistic to think that one moderately familiar with polygraphy, as the psy-
chophysiologists from the survey claim to be, will ever choose "D," "[the polygraph] is of
no usefulness." Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016 n.229.
282. See Honts & Quick, supra note 3, at 1016 n.229.
283. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (vesting the
power to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effects outweigh its probative value with the
trial judge). At least one commentator predicted that Daubert would result in an in-
creased use of Rule 403 to attack scientific theories grounded upon questionable method-
ologies. See SALTZBURG, supra note 144, at 223.
284. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing a
trial court's decision to allow expert polygraph testimony based on its prejudicial impact);
Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that polygraph evidence
could result in overwhelming prejudice); United States v. Falsia, 724 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1983) (warning that admitting polygraph testimony could easily mislead the jury);
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that admission of
polygraph evidence would greatly prejudice the party against whom it was offered).
285. See infra Part IV.D (describing the prejudicial impact polygraph testimony will
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Rule 403 provides that evidence should be inadmissible if the trial
judge finds its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative
value. Some courts have recognized the need for a more expansive
reading of Rule 403 when dealing with questions of polygraph admissi-
bility.27 In light of the low validity ratesm and weak examiner stan-
dards,2s9 the results of polygraph examinations are untrustworthy, and,
thus, are of low probative value.2 '0 Exclusion should result if the prejudi-
cial value can be established to be substantially greater than the proba-
tive value of this inherently unreliable evidence.29'
The first conflict with Rule 403 arises out of the excess weight that ju-
ries attach to the proffered polygraph testimony.2n A scientifically valid
study demonstrated that the addition of unfavorable polygraph evidence
against a defendant caused 54% of jurors to change their not guilty ver-
have on juries).
286. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text (providing
the text of Rule 403). Evidence that is prejudicial is not necessarily excludable. Rather,
such evidence must be of such a prejudicial nature that it "substantially outweigh[s]"
whatever probative value the testimony might have. FED. R. EVID. 403. According to
the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403, undue prejudice means "an undue tendency
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one." FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note. Excludable evidence may in fact be
highly relevant. See id.; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the
presumption of admissibility under Rule 403).
287. See United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir. 1995) (calling for a more
"enhanced role" for Rule 403 in light of Daubert). Indeed, Daubert itself noted that the
potential for expert evidence to prejudice or mislead the jury mandated an active applica-
tion of Rule 403. 509 U.S. at 595.
288. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the lack of validity and accuracy in polygraph
testing).
289. See supra Part IV.B (describing the poor training and lack of competency of
many "qualified" polygraph examiners).
290. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 265, 270 (citing low validity rates and a number of
other polygraph flaws in reaching the conclusion that polygraph results are of little utility
in the courtroom).
291. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing for exclusion when the probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by potential prejudice).
292. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975). The Alexander
court was extremely concerned about the prejudicial impact that would result if polygraph
evidence were offered at trial. Id. According to the court, the expert's testimony was
"likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility" that would cause the jurors to
"give significant, if not conclusive, weight to a polygraphist's opinion" regarding the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. Id.; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 206, at 375
(stating that polygraph evidence may be excludable because "jurors would be unduly im-
pressed with the 'scientific' testimony on a crucial and typically determinative matter").
Commentators often have warned against the potentially prejudicial effects of expert sci-
entific testimony. See Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1237. ("The major danger of scientific
evidence is its potential to mislead the jury ... ").
1291
Catholic University Law Review
dicts to guilty.293 This same study found that jurors over the age of
twenty-three overwhelmingly agreed with whatever side was offering the
expert polygraph testimony.294 A different survey found that five of nine
jurors were so overwhelmed by lie detector testimony that they accepted
its veracity without question. 5 Yet another study found that 40% of
prospective jurors would change their not guilty pleas to guilty based
solely on the addition of harmful polygraph evidence characterized as
being 85% accurate. 6
Polygraph advocates cite studies that allegedly support the notion that
297polygraph testimony does not unduly sway juries, yet even these find-ings reveal basic prejudicial impacts.29 In the post-Daubert era, at least
293. See Markwart & Lynch, supra note 26, at 328. The results of the study showed
that 22 of 42 jurors changed their verdicts when the prosecution offered unfavorable
polygraph evidence against the defendant at trial. See id.
294. See id. at 329. The study also found that 86% of those over the age of 23 voted
with whichever side benefited from the polygraph examination. See id. Since most jurors
in a jury pool would likely be above the age of 23, "then possibly a... greater impact
could be expected in a real jury situation." Id. at 331.
295. See Forkosch, supra note 26, at 229-30. The survey arose after a New York state
judge admitted the results of a lie detector test into trial. See id. at 225. To ascertain the
evidence's impact and influence on the jury, the author of the article sent the jury a series
of questions. See id. at 228. The questions ranged from "Until the testimony of the 'lie
detector' did you think Kenny [the defendant] should have been convicted?" to "Did you
base your vote upon such testimony alone?" Id. The question of concern was "Were you
so impressed by the scientific value of the 'lie detector' that you accepted its testimony
without question?" Id. Five of nine responded in the affirmative to this question. See id.
at 229.
296. See Joseph H. Koffler, The Lie Detector-A Critical Appraisal of the Technique
as a Potential Undermining Factor in the Judicial Process, 3 N.Y.L.F. 123, 138-46 (1957).
In this study, Professor Koffler asked twenty students to read a hypothetical criminal
case. See id. at 138-40. All 20 found the defendant not guilty. See id. at 140. When told
that the same defendant had failed a polygraph exam recognized as 85% accurate, 8 of 20
changed their verdicts to guilty. See id. When told that the defendant had failed a test
which was 99% accurate, a figure closer to the one polygraph experts often quote today,
17 of 20, or 85%, changed their verdicts from innocent to guilty. See id. The hypothetical
jurors reached this result even though the polygraph testimony constituted the sole evi-
dence implicating the defendant in the crime. See id. From this, Koffler concluded that
"[ilt would appear that if a defendant is in fact truthful, but the results of a lie detector
test indicate that he is lying, he will probably be found guilty." Id. at 143.
297. See McCall, supra note 1, at 376-77 (referring to a 1979 study that claimed juries
gave no extra weight to polygraph testimony).
298. See Stephen C. Carlson et al., The Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on Jury Delib-
erations: An Empirical Study, 5 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 148, 152 (1977). The authors'
studies revealed that 56% of potential jurors would change or would possibly change their
votes based solely on the addition of 95% accurate polygraph testimony. See id. at 152.
Given that experts at trial often cite this 95% accuracy rate for polygraph results, such a
strong prejudicial impact on juries established exclusively by polygraph evidence is star-
tling. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 891-92 (D.N.M. 1995) (citing Dr.
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four federal opinions chose to exclude selected polygraph evidence be-
cause of its unfairly prejudicial nature."
The danger of unfair prejudice is even more significant when poly-
graph testimony is studied in contrast with other forms of expert scien-
tific evidence.3 Expert polygraph evidence is distinguishable from tech-
niques such as DNA testing and voice identification testimony in that
only polygraphy goes directly to the ultimate issue at trial: the defen-
Raskin for the proposition that only 5% to 10% of all polygraph examinations result in
error).
299. See, e.g., United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding poly-
graph evidence to be inadmissible under Rule 403 because of its potential to mislead and
confuse the jury), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343 (1996); United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d
1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding polygraph results excludable under Rule 403), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 795 (1996); Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 662-63 (6th Cir. 1994)
(excluding polygraph results because of their prejudicial influence on the jury); Palmer v.
City of Monticello, 31 F.3d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994) (upholding a lower court decision
to exclude polygraph testimony because its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative
value). While it is conceded that each court chose to exclude the polygraph evidence un-
der Rule 403 for different reasons, the end result is that in each circumstance the court
found that the prejudicial impact of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative
value. See, e.g., Kwong, 69 F.3d at 668; Sherlin, 67 F.3d at 1217; Conti, 39 F.3d at 662-63;
Palmer, 31 F.3d at 1506.
300. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 269 (describing the differences between expert
polygraph testimony and other forms of expert testimony).
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dant's guilt or innocence 01 If believed by the jury, the expert polygraph
testimony decides the case. m
The jury, and not the expert polygraph examiner or a machine, is le-
gally entrusted with the power to determine truths from falsehoods. 
3
By allowing experts to comment on this issue, courts are basically sur-
rendering the most central duty of the jury to the judgment of an ex-
pert. 304 At best, this would serve to confuse the jury as to its proper role,
301. See id. In other scientifically reliable techniques, the expert may believe that the
defendant's blood was identified by DNA testing, or that his fingerprints match those on
the murder weapon. See id. Such opinions are weighed by the juries against the "merits
of any alternative explanations" or other facts that tend to contradict the expert testi-
mony. Id.
On the other hand, the opinion of the polygraph examiner is offered to resolve one is-
sue-the defendant's guilt or innocence. See id. As Lykken points out, if the jury be-
lieves the testimony of the expert polygraph examiner, "their verdict is decided." Id. All
other evidence is irrelevant and superfluous. See id. Furthermore, many scientific proc-
esses such as DNA analysis and fingerprinting rely upon "conceptual models which ex-
plain and predict observable phenomena." United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513
(D. Md. 1973). Such processes producing tangible results are "much more susceptible to
controlled experimental verification." Id. In laymen's terms, the physical nature of the
tests guarantees they can be verified. See id. Polygraphy, however, probes the inner
sanctum of the human psyche, a fact that effectively "preclude[s] the ... probability of
accuracy of a polygraph examination." Id. at 514. Thus, the polygraph is fundamentally
different from other forms of scientific evidence courts have previously deemed to be ac-
curate and admissible. See id. at 513-14.
Rule 704 clearly states that, subject to part (b) of the rule, evidence is not excludable
merely because it goes to the ultimate issue of the case. See FED. R. EVID. 704. Subdivi-
sion (b) of Rule 704, however, prohibits a witness from testifying as to a defendant's men-
tal state or condition that is an element of the charged crime. See id. Such issues are left
solely for the jury to determine. See id. Since a polygraph examination probes the inner
psyche of the mind to arrive at a conclusion of guilt or innocence, it seems as if this is the
type of "mental" judgment subdivision (b) was attempting to reserve for the jury alone.
302. See Lykken, supra note 24, at 269. Some believe that because instruments such
as breathalyzers and radar guns also go to the ultimate issue of the case and are admissi-
ble, the polygraph should be admissible as well. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp.
90, 96 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Since the polygraph is not nearly as accurate as these particular
instrumentalities, this point is moot. See supra Part IV.A (explaining the inaccurate na-
ture of polygraph examinations).
303. See United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding
that the jury, and not a polygraph machine, is entrusted with determining the truthfulness
of witnesses).
304. See Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that "to permit expert testimony for the purpose of determining the
credibility of a witness 'would be an invitation for the trier of fact to abdicate its responsi-
bility to ascertain the facts relying upon the questionable premise that the expert is in a
better position to make such a judgment."' Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 352
A.2d 30, 32 (Pa. 1976)); see also United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820, 824 (A.F.C.M.R.
1981) (describing factfinders as those responsible for determining the "ultimate issue of
guilt or innocence").
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a violation potentially excludable under Rule 403. 305 At worst, it would
encourage jurors to merely "defer" on the question of the defendant's
truthfulness to the expert polygrapher.0 Such prejudicial effects sub-
stantially outweigh the testimony's limited probative value in violation of
Rule 403.30
The second conflict with Rule 403 results from the Rule's exclusion of
relevant evidence if it would result in an unnecessary waste of time. 08
The specific inquiry needed to determine the admissibility of polygraph
evidence could certainly be classified as wasteful.3 10 Such fact-specific in-
305. See Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Providing the jury
with an all or nothing evaluation of credibility and then telling the jury that this evalua-
tion has an eighty percent to ninety percent chance of being accurate ... interferes with,
rather than enhances, the deliberative process."); see generally Seese, 517 A.2d at 922 (de-
scribing the potential effects of polygraph evidence on the role of juries if admitted).
306. See State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1128 (La. 1993) (holding that the exclusion of
polygraph testimony was proper since it would infringe upon the province of the jury); see
also Helton, 10 M.J. at 824 n.16 ("Presented with conflicting and unreconcilable evidence,
the temptation would be great for the court to defer to the opinion of the polygraph ex-
aminer, and abrogate its factfinding responsibility.").
307. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (describing types of prejudicial impact on juries, including
misleading and confusing the jury). To caution jurors as to the potentially prejudicial ef-
fects of "shaky" but admissible scientific evidence, Daubert suggested that the trial judge
issue jury instructions. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
At least one court deciding on polygraph admissibility has found this to be a prudent sug-
gestion. See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1362 (D. Ariz. 1995). Some
courts and commentators consistently have doubted the effectiveness of limiting instruc-
tions, however, especially with regard to the opinions of polygraph experts. See Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by instructions to the jury.., all practicing lawyers know to be unmiti-
gated fiction.") (citation omitted); see also United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1263
(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the limiting instruction on the weight of the expert polygraph
evidence was "not always sufficient to cure the effect of potential prejudice"); Giannelli,
supra note 9, at 1238. Commentator Paul Giannelli, referring to all expert scientific tes-
timony, states unless "the trial judge is knowledgeable about the technique ... he cannot
appreciate the extent to which the jury is being misled." Id. This "lack of knowledge
limits the efficacy" of a cautionary instruction, thereby failing to aid the triers of fact in
removing the apparent prejudicial effects of the expert evidence. Id.; Fredric D.
Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Un-
reliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1004 (1977) (noting the inef-
fectiveness of jury instructions in protecting the innocent from eyewitness identification
testimony).
308. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
309. See, e.g., United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the
per se rule of inadmissibility and calling for a fact-specific determination of polygraph
evidence by each trial judge); United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 881 (D.N.M.
1995) (requiring a specific inquiry in light of Daubert every time polygraph evidence is
offered); Crumby, 895 F. Supp. at 1358 (calling for a detailed analysis of both parties' data
to determine the admissibility of the proffered polygraph testimony).
310. See Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986) (criticizing the fact that
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quiries may consume precious judicial resources and dissipate valuable
court time.311 Aware of this fact, the drafters of Military Rule of Evi-
dence 707 included this wasted time argument as a basis for banning all
forms of polygraph testimony in military trials in 1991." Despite Dau-
bert's call for specific inquiries, the time and resources squandered are
too great for a procedure of questionable accuracy, 3 conducted by insuf-
ficiently trained and incompetent examiners,314 and with a great potential
for prejudicing juries.315 For these reasons, Rule 403 should exclude such
testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusions that are generated when applying the Daubert criteria
to the question of polygraph admissibility clearly point to the exclusion
of the proffered polygraph testimony. The accuracy and validity of the
polygraph is low and uncertain. As a result, countless numbers of inno-
cent subjects could be branded as liars or vice versa. The test is suscepti-
ble to easily comprehended countermeasures. The numerous poorly
trained and incompetent examiners who conduct the tests throughout
the nation further amplify the rates of error. In addition, polygraph
testing lacks the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community.
Even if the Daubert standard were to be somehow satisfied, Rule 403
would exclude the proffered testimony because of its highly prejudicial
the expert polygraph testimony spanned two full days of an eight day trial).
311. See United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
district court may exclude polygraph evidence when it appears that vital judicial resources
would be wasted); see also Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. at 878 (taking two courtroom days to
conduct a proper Daubert inquiry); MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 206, at 375 ("[J]udicial
and related resources would be squandered in producing and coping with the expert
[polygraph] testimony.
312. See MIL. R. EVID. 707; see also McCall, supra note 1, at 391. Then President
George Bush was the individual responsible for promulgating this rule in 1991. See id. It
banned the use of all polygraph results from military trials, even if stipulated to in ad-
vance. See id. This decision came close on the heels of the congressional decision to pro-
hibit the use of polygraph tests by private employers engaged in interstate commerce, also
known as the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. See H.R. 1212, 100th Cong. (1987)
(enacted). The rationale for this legislation includes a general lack of faith in the poly-
graph theory as a whole, its lack of acceptance by both the American Psychological and
American Medical Associations, the subjectivity of the final polygraph results, and its po-
tential for adversely affecting minorities with different physiological stress patterns. See
H.R. REP. No. 100-208, at 1-7 (1987).
313. See supra Part IV.A (describing the poor rates of error associated with the mod-
ern polygraph).
314. See supra Part IV.B (explaining the poor state of polygraph examiners in the
United States).
315. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the prejudicial impact of expert polygraph testi-
mony).
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nature, its penchant for misleading and confusing juries, and its tendency
to dissipate precious court time and resources. Until these numerous
problems can be eradicated, the polygraph should remain inadmissible in
the American courtroom. To hold otherwise is to believe falsehoods
about a machine that claims to uncover the truth.
Timothy B. Henseler

